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In this dissertation, I argue that full funding programs such as those functioning in the 
legislative elections of Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine alter the behavior of 
candidates and voters alike. I employ original survey and interview data from 
candidates in eighteen states, finding strong evidence of different campaign strategies 
when public money is present in a political system. While the effects of some of these 
changes are generally positive, the ramifications of others are not clear. Regardless, I 
show that in evaluating the true effect of public funding, its bearing on political 
behavior must be considered.  
 
Using genetic matching methods, I demonstrate that the acceptance of full public 
election subsidies provides candidates with time flexibility facilitating higher levels of 
direct interaction with citizens. I then exploit a natural experiment to demonstrate that 
Maine and Connecticut voters are more likely to cast ballots for state legislative 
contests when candidates accept full funding. Specifically, the results of two 
difference-in-differences models show that the presence of a publicly funded 
candidate diminishes ballot roll-off by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points.  
 
I then argue that ideology is a crucial determinant of participation in full funding 
systems, which I support with a utility model showing that very conservative 
 candidates face high personal costs that make a privately funded campaign a more 
attractive option. The model predicts that Republican incumbents should therefore be 
more likely to face a publicly funded challenger. I confirm this prediction with logistic 
regression models from data in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. Since I confirm with 
genetic matching that fully funded candidates perform better on Election Day, I argue 
that the practical effect of public funding may be uneven in terms of partisan 
affiliation.  
 
Finally, I evaluate the effects of public funding on the behavior of candidates who 
choose not to participate. I analyze the transcripts of 16 in-person interviews with 
sixteen Arizona legislative candidates. I find that the state's matching funds provisions 
lead to pervasive gaming. Specifically, traditional candidates delay fundraising and 
spending until the final days of an election, which denies their publicly-funded 
opponents an opportunity to spend matching funds.  
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1 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
“The great majority of mankind is satisfied with appearances as though they were 
realities, and is often more influenced by the things that seem than by those that are.” 
 
-Niccolo Machiavelli 
 
American elections are often expensive, uncompetitive, or both. Moreover, stories of 
issues ranging from close relationships between legislators and lobbyists to outright 
corruption have likely convinced many citizens that the political process is slanted 
toward the rich and powerful. Prospective candidates no doubt harbor similar feelings 
as they face an electoral system in which incumbents exploit financial and other 
advantages to solidify their positions. When incumbents regularly win expensive, 
interest-fueled campaigns, it is not difficult to understand these frustrations. Indeed, 
for those seeking a democracy in which elections are won solely on the basis of 
superior ideas, the political landscape in the United States must seem a bleak place. 
 
Some states have attempted to combat these issues with what Sorauf (1992, 131) 
termed “the fifth source” of political money, supplementing contributions from 
individuals, parties, groups, and the candidates themselves with public election 
funding. Public funding schemes exist at the federal, state, and local levels of 
American government. Because of this breadth, there is substantial diversity in their 
construct. Since public financing schemes were first implemented during the wave of 
post-Watergate reforms, the burning question has been, “do they work?” To date, even 
with a relatively clear set of reform objectives, the answer has been elusive. Measures 
of success are often ill-defined, and the programs’ effects on candidate strategy and 
behavior have been largely unstudied.  
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At the same time, the stakes are rising. Public election funding is currently available in 
some form in roughly half of the states. In many of those, public money is channeled 
through party organizations, or is available only to gubernatorial candidates. However, 
recent initiatives in state-level public financing are focused on directly funding a wide 
array of candidates, ranging from statewide offices to the lower legislative chamber. 
Some states, such as Minnesota, Hawaii, and Wisconsin, have long provided 
candidates with direct, partial public financing designed to pay for part of their 
election costs, but these programs have given way in the 2000s to programs that 
provide subsidies intended to cover the entire cost of an election.  
 
In the late 1990s, voters in Maine and Arizona passed ballot referenda to provide 
candidates for all state offices with subsidies intended to cover the entirety of their 
campaign costs. These measures, generally referred to as “Clean Elections” laws, took 
effect in 2000. Since then, full public funding has spread steadily to other states. For 
instance, Connecticut began its own full funding program for all state offices in 2008. 
New Mexico implemented a Clean Elections program for its Public Regulation 
Commission candidates in 2003, and extended the program to its judicial candidates in 
2007. North Carolina implemented full funding for judicial candidates in 2004, as did 
Wisconsin in 2009 and West Virginia in 2010. New Jersey is currently studying a pilot 
program in its legislative elections, and Rhode Island is considering a similar trial 
while a ballot initiative is pending in California. The cities of Albuquerque and 
Portland have recently passed full funding laws for municipal elections and at least a 
dozen other cities, including Seattle, are considering them. Moreover, as of early 2010, 
a bill is pending to offer major public funding to candidates for both houses of the 
United States Congress. 
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Despite the increasing ubiquity of direct public funding programs, political scientists 
have not rigorously studied how these programs affect candidate and voter behavior. 
Most studies have to date concentrated only on one aspect of campaigns, and 
sometimes in only one state or election. Furthermore, scholars tend to evaluate the 
programs’ success in achieving the stated goals of the reform movement, such as 
enhanced competition or the emergence of more or different challengers (La Raja 
2008; Malhotra 2008; Werner and Mayer 2007; Kraus, 2006; Mayer, Werner, and 
Williams 2006; Government Accountability Office 2003; Schultz, 2002, Malbin and 
Gais 1998, 136; Mayer & Wood 1995; Donnay and Ramsden 1995; Jones and Borris 
1985). As a result, studies are often hobbled by illusory concepts, vague definition, or 
a failure to account for the inherently political character of elections. Finally, to my 
knowledge the potential for unintended or overlooked consequences of public funding 
has not been considered in the academic literature. 
 
In this dissertation, I move beyond simple evaluations of the reform agenda, focusing 
instead on the manner in which public election funding changes political incentives for 
all candidates both before and after they make the decision of whether to accept public 
subsidies.1 By extension, I argue that full funding programs such as those functioning 
in the legislative elections of Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine alter the behavior of 
candidates and voters alike. I find strong evidence of different campaign strategies 
when public money is present in a political system. While the effects of some of these 
changes are generally positive, the ramifications of others are not clear. Regardless, 
my findings show that in evaluating the true effect of public funding as policy, its 
bearing on political behavior must be considered. 
 
                                                 
1 I describe both the reform rationale and previous academic studies at length below. 
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Why Public Funding? 
 
Public election funding made its first appearance in the United States with the passage 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. As amended in 1974, the 
FECA created a voluntary public funding system for presidential elections including 
partial matching funds in primaries and full funding with spending caps in the general 
election. The law also mandated contribution and spending limits in Congressional 
races, largely in response to Watergate-era perceptions that special interests had 
gained unfair leverage in expensive, media-driven campaigns. Thus, the FECA was 
designed to curb both spending and the influence of any single contributor while 
preserving system transparency in all federal elections.  
 
However, subsequent litigation on several facets of the FECA set hard rules on 
campaign finance regulation that continue to affect public funding programs today. In 
Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 1976), the FECA was contested on the grounds that 
mandatory spending and contribution caps restricted the speech of candidates and their 
supporters. In a per curiam opinion, the Court upheld the presidential public financing 
programs because participation is voluntary. The Court also found that the main 
element of speech in a political contribution is the expression of support:  
 
A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his 
views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of 
communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his 
contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of 
contributing (Ibid.). 
This logic allowed the Court to uphold the constitutionality of contribution limitations 
while striking down forced spending limits. The Court found that restrictions on 
candidate spending equate to “direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of 
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political speech” and are therefore unreasonable restrictions of First Amendment 
rights (Ibid). 
 
For reformers who see money as a nefarious element in American politics, the Buckley 
decision has forced creativity. Since spending limits cannot be imposed upon 
candidates, states looking to reduce the role of money in politics must provide 
candidates with a reason to accept restrictions on their campaign spending. Public 
funding programs seem to be natural vehicle to this end; not only do subsidies serve as 
an incentive for candidates to participate, but they also directly address several 
problems beyond cost inflation. Indeed, critics of the prevailing campaign finance 
system often cite public funding as a panacea of sorts, with the potential to alleviate 
one or all of at least four major deficiencies in American elections: high average costs, 
low average competition, the appearance of corruption, and the burden that 
fundraising places on campaigns. 
 
Paramount among these is the failure of existing regulation to curb the growth of 
campaign costs. During the last thirty years, overall expenditure levels have grown 
markedly in both federal and state races (e.g., Jacobson 2009; Gross & Goidel 2003, 
35; Lott 2000; Malbin & Gais 1998, 15; Moncrief 1992; Gierzynski and Breaux 1993; 
1991). Access to deeper, more established resource networks is but one component of 
the advantage that nearly all incumbents enjoy over challengers, and expensive races 
allow incumbents to construct a financial fortress that makes them seem unassailable 
(See: Jacobson 2009; Goodliffe 2001; Cassie and Breaux 1998; Cox & Morgenstern, 
1995; 1993; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 1991; Gierzynski & Breaux 1991; Squire 
1991). Faced with such a financial disadvantage, many potential challengers likely 
conclude that facing an incumbent is a quixotic pursuit. 
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This trend contributes to the second problem: uncompetitive American elections. 
When incumbents are met with a challenge, they consistently win by wide margins. 
Particularly for new candidates with little or no established funding network, raising 
sufficient funds is inherently problematic as they face the familiar paradox: To appear 
viable to the individuals and groups necessary to fund a serious campaign, candidates 
must have money, but to raise money, they must appear viable (see: Jacobson 1980). 
Inexperienced challengers find it difficult to convince skeptical donors, and are unable 
to keep pace financially with resource-laden incumbents. Moreover, there is 
substantial evidence suggesting that while money alone does not necessarily equate to 
votes, its absence essentially eliminates a challenger from contention (e.g., Alexander 
2005; Herrnson 2004, 248; Malbin & Gais 1998, 145; Cassie and Breaux 1998; 
Gierzynski and Breaux 1993; 1991; Green & Krasno 1990; Jacobson 1990; Tucker 
and Weber 1987; Giles and Pritchard 1985; Caldeira and Patterson 1982; Howell 
1982; Jacobson 1980). Thus, the absence of quality candidates perpetuates a wide 
spending gap between incumbents and challengers at both the federal (e.g., Jacobson 
2009) and state level (e.g., Cassie and Breaux 1998). Given these circumstances, it is 
no surprise that when incumbents run, they have an excellent chance of winning (e.g. 
Jacobson 2009; Herrnson 2004, 22; Krasno 1994; Abramowitz 1991; Weber, Tucker, 
& Brace 1991).  
 
Third, reformers claim that the gaudy sums required for political campaigning invite 
opportunistic behavior of external actors seeking to influence public policy. With 
limited resources, federal political action committees (PACs) seek to achieve this goal 
by betting on candidates likely to win and to hold key legislative positions. In both 
federal and state elections, incumbents, party leadership, and powerful members of the 
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rank and file benefited disproportionately from PAC donations in the 1990s (Cassie 
and Thompson 1998; Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994; Thielemann and Dixon 
1994; Herrnson 1992; Stratmann 1992; Snyder 1990). Recent evidence suggests that 
PACs tend to contribute late in the election to Congressional candidates who have 
already demonstrated fundraising success (McGhee and La Raja 2008). Alexander 
(2005) suggests that such a strategy is paying off in federal elections, as PAC 
contributions are associated with better-performing candidates.  
 
The strategic behavior of PACs is intended to maximize the odds that the groups they 
represent receive a return on their investment, leading some reformers to conclude that 
PAC money is dangerous because of the possibility for a quid pro quo exchange 
between contributor and legislator. Scholarly analysis in this area has reached mixed 
conclusions. Some have found evidence of PAC donations influencing member 
participation or votes (e.g., Witko 2006; Fellowes & Wolf 2004; Gordon 2001; 
Stratmann 1992; Hall and Wayman 1990). Others, however, have found no 
relationship (Wawro 2001; Bronars & Lott 1997; Grenzke 1989). Hoffman (2005) 
finds that PAC money has heightened influence in non-professionalized state 
legislatures, in which members have fewer resources to provide a resistance buffer.  
 
When it comes to vote-buying by interest groups, however, academic evidence may be 
less important than the widespread public perception that elite influence-peddling is 
rampant in American politics (Magleby & Patterson, 1994; Wertheimer & Manes, 
1994; Sabato, 1989). Or, as Frank Sorauf (1994) aptly put it:  
 
Mass beliefs create their own very exigent reality. If public acceptance of a 
demonology of campaign finance leads to a disenchantment with electoral politics and 
an alienation from American representative democracy, action is all the more 
necessary, regardless of whose reality can be confirmed. 
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Indeed, in rendering the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court found contribution 
limits acceptable not only “in preventing corruption,” but also “the appearance of 
corruption” (424 U.S. 1 1976). Public funding advocates reason that even if there is no 
overt exchange of contributions for legislative votes, in reducing the role of business, 
labor, and other interest contributions in election campaigns, public money addresses 
the appearance of such nefarious relationships, thus increasing public confidence in 
democratic institutions. 
 
Fourth, for many prospective candidates, even raising amounts necessary for a 
$20,000 state legislative campaign requires a tenacious dedication, the assembly of a 
fundraising organization, and the consumption of a large amount of time. For all but 
the most resolute, it is a daunting prospect made even worse by the fact that most 
candidates view fundraising as a loathsome chore (Jacobson 1987). This fact alone no 
doubt keeps many challengers out of politics altogether, but for those who do enter, 
the necessity of fundraising detracts from time that could be spent interacting with 
voters, creating an opportunity cost in terms of improving stature against better-known 
incumbents (see: Francia & Herrnson 2003). For officeholders, raising money has 
become such an onerous task that some have argued that it threatens to erode the 
quality of governance (Epstein & Zemsky 1995; Blasi 1994; Nelson & Magleby 1990; 
Sabato 1989, 5).  
 
For reformers seeking to solve these problems, public election financing seems like a 
logical answer. Candidates opt into programs that include spending limits because 
they receive a subsidy in exchange. By providing challengers with more money while 
requiring candidates to spend less overall, public funding programs promise to close 
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spending gaps between challengers and incumbents, reducing the overall cost of 
elections. Moreover, subsidies diminish candidates’ reliance on so-called “special 
interest” contributions, reducing the likelihood that interest groups will gain undue 
influence over legislative activities. Finally, candidates recognize that subsidies allow 
them to avoid the dreaded task of fundraising, which also facilitates greater control 
over the remainder of their campaign time. 
 
Public Funding: Does it Work? 
 
Efforts to gauge the efficacy of public funding programs have nearly always relied on 
their ability to address the problems described above. Generally speaking, when it 
comes to altering the political landscape, previous analysis demonstrates that the size 
of the subsidy matters a great deal. For example, while partial subsidies have shown 
some promise in slowing spending inflation in Wisconsin (Mayer & Wood 1995), they 
have proven ineffective in New York City municipal elections (Kraus 2006) and 
Minnesota state campaigns (Schultz 2002). An early study of Minnesota found that 
public funds have helped private contributors to gain an aggregate dollar advantage 
over PACs (Jones and Borris 1985). However, Schultz (2002) found that Minnesota’s 
partial public subsidies have not actually reduced the spending of PACs, which had 
simply channeled their money through soft money and lobbyists. Scholars have also 
found little competitive change in partially-subsidized elections (e.g., Jones & Borris 
1985; Mayer & Wood 1995; Malbin & Gais 1998, 136; but see: Donnay & Ramsden 
1995). 
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Yet, there is a growing body of evidence supporting the notion that full funding 
achieves at least some of the objectives described above. Prior to implementation of 
full funding programs in Arizona and Maine for the 2000 election, a simulation study 
suggested that more generous subsidies would lead to enhanced electoral competition 
(Goidel & Gross 1996). Indeed, analysis of elections in both states since 2000 has 
consistently found higher levels of competition when full funding is present 
(Government Accountability Office 2003; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006; 
Werner and Mayer 2007; Malhotra 2008). Others have found that Clean Elections may 
be altering the number or type of candidates involved in politics on average. For 
instance, La Raja (2008) reports that Connecticut's program serves as an attractive 
incentive for candidates considering an entry into politics, while Werner and Mayer 
(2007) found that women are more likely to participate in public funding programs.2 
Finally, Francia and Herrnson's (2003) study supports the notion of altered time 
patterns in fully funding systems, confirming that Clean Election candidates spend less 
time fundraising.  
 
The incipient conclusion regarding public funding efficacy is that full funding has 
promise while partial funding seems to do little to change the electoral environment. A 
number of scholars have argued that full funding improves competition and may 
encourage a broader spectrum of potential candidates to run. Yet, to date these studies 
have focused mainly on readily observable outcomes, ignoring the underlying 
processes. In the following section, I describe how a focus on candidate incentives and 
political behavior allows for a more complete understanding of the manner in which 
public funding affects American elections. 
                                                 
2 However, a 2008 study by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials found 
little evidence of increased numbers of Latino candidates after the implementation of Clean Elections. 
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Evaluation: A Candidate-Centered Approach 
 
Despite growing academic attention, I argue that the traditional practice of conforming 
research questions to the reformist agenda has focused academic attention on too few 
questions to the detriment of others. “Competition,” for example, is typically 
measured as the percentage of votes that candidates in a paired race receive in a 
general election. Yet, this measure tells us little about the conduct and character of the 
race. Reformers assume that the general election vote percentage is an output solely 
resultant of candidates’ enhanced financial stature, but it is also determined by their 
strategic choices. Those choices broaden substantially when subsidies are introduced 
to an electoral system, and we should expect candidate behavior to follow in turn. Put 
another way, I believe that the simple infusion of money does not automatically 
improve the competitive environment; rather, the various provisions of full funding 
systems in particular alter campaign behavior.  
 
In focusing analysis of public election funding initiatives on readily available 
measures such as money or votes, I argue that scholars have overlooked a crucial 
aspect of public financing laws: their capacity to change the political behavior of elites 
and masses alike. The assumption that public money can alter some single aspect of 
elections without dramatically changing the system as a whole is a short-sighted one. 
Public election funding introduces new incentives to the entire electoral system and 
alters the strategic considerations of all players, the challenger-incumbent dynamic, 
and the relationship between campaigns and voters. If changes in spending or 
competition are present, they are likely one aspect of an electoral environment that is 
fundamentally altered by an infusion of public subsidies. Rather than analyzing 
 12 
election data from afar, the strategic choices of the candidate, and the bearing of those 
decisions on mass behavior and election outcomes must therefore be illuminated.  
 
In this dissertation, I build on previous work, moving toward a better understanding of 
public funding's true impact on candidates, groups, and voters. Guided by the 
literature cited above, I anticipate that effects will be observable in Arizona, 
Connecticut, and Maine, where candidates for all state offices have the option to 
accept full public election subsidies. That said, I examine survey and election data 
from state legislative candidates in all states where direct public funding is available. 
My analysis is confined largely to lower-house state legislative candidates because the 
effects of public funding should be most observable in their elections, which generally 
have lower average campaign costs and a less professionalized campaign 
environment.3 
 
I find that full public funding leads to at least four changes for candidates. First, I 
argue that subsidies lend candidates a higher degree of control over their time, leading 
to changes in their behavior. Fundraising is difficult, and campaigning with limited 
resources is not a particularly enjoyable experience. Full financing of the sort in 
Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine eliminates the necessity of fundraising, creating the 
possibility for a new kind of politics. Specifically, because they do not spend time 
fundraising, candidates who accept full funding should spend more time interacting 
with the public, media, and interest groups with standing as viable candidates. In other 
words, with time and money to communicate a targeted mobilization message, 
campaigns will seek to do so. For challengers, this means campaigning door to door, 
                                                 
3 Statistical convenience also drives the decision to examine state house elections. In all publicly funded 
states, the lower house offers the largest candidate population from which to draw a sample. 
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telephoning constituents, and posting signs, all under the cover of “air support” 
provided by advertising and mailings purchased with public funds. Challengers’ 
ability to perform these tasks unencumbered by fundraising responsibilities should 
lead to a higher level of efficacy, which could explain enhanced competition in 
publicly-funded systems. 
 
Second, the higher level of interaction between campaigns and the public should lead 
to altered voting behavior. High quality contact between voters and candidates or 
organizations has consistently been shown to stimulate voting turnout (Han 2009; 
Parry et al. 2008; Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; Nickerson 2006; Nickerson, 
Friedrichs, and King 2006; Bennion 2005; Hillygus 2005; Nickerson 2005; Ramirez 
2005; Wong 2005; Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003; Michelson 2003; Niven 2002; 
Niven 2001a; Niven 2001b; Gerber and Green 2000; Kramer 1970). While I do not 
believe that an election for state house is sufficient to drive turnout, I do expect that 
the presence of a publicly funded candidate will diminish ballot roll-off. Since 
information is particularly valuable to non-partisans in low-information elections 
(Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto 2000; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996), I 
expect that a heightened level of engagement between candidate and voter will result 
in more citizens voting in legislative elections where a publicly funded candidate is 
present. In short, I believe that the marginally improved competition visible in many 
publicly funded elections is not solely due to more mailings or advertisements 
purchased with subsidies, but is rather likely a symptom of less observable changes 
occurring as candidates adapt to a new kind of ground campaign. 
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Third, while the reform movement views Clean Elections programs as a great 
equalizing force that lowers costs for all participating candidates, I argue that the 
acceptance of public funding actually creates political and/or emotional costs for 
some. Specifically, I expect that candidates with a very conservative fiscal ideology 
will perceive public funding as being incongruent with either their own beliefs or 
those that prevail among the electorate in their legislative district. Participation in 
public funding therefore requires such candidates to either compromise their political 
beliefs or to risk a backlash from a disapproving electorate. Accordingly, such 
candidates should be more likely to opt out of public funding. In the context of an 
incumbent-challenged election, Democratic incumbents therefore should be less likely 
to face a publicly funded challenger. Such a disparity may seem trivial on its face, but 
when coupled with previous findings that publicly funded challengers perform better 
against incumbents, it is worth examining whether public funding systematically 
benefits one party. This question is particularly important given the even-handed 
rhetoric of the Clean Elections reform movement. 
 
Finally, reformers and most scholars have largely ignored the possibility for public 
funding to change the behavior even of candidates who choose to opt out of public 
funding and to raise money from private sources. I argue that “Clean Elections” 
programs that mandate financial parity via matching funds provisions do indeed affect 
the behavior of these so-called “traditional candidates.”4 In races pitting a traditionally 
funded candidate against one accepting public funding, the former has a strong 
incentive to withhold expenditures or change spending patterns in order to avoid 
triggering matching contributions. In other words, since most activities come with a 
financial cost, traditional candidates have an incentive to refrain from campaigning. 
                                                 
4 I describe these provisions in Chapter 1. 
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The effects of these changes are unclear. However, they affect all candidates, not just 
those accepting public money, and they should be better understood. 
 
Given the increasing ubiquity of public election funding, the establishment of a 
meaningful evaluative framework is becoming more important. Political science must 
eschew narrow judgments in favor of a broad understanding of the altered electoral 
landscape in the American states. Public funding programs directly effect the 
expenditure of millions of dollars and the fortunes of countless campaigns. In short, 
before we can determine whether publicly funded elections are better, we must first 
understand how they are different. This process begins with an examination of the 
strategic incentives that full funding in particular creates. 
 
A Note on Candidate Survey and Other Data 
 
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I analyze elite survey data collected from the major party 
lower house candidate populations in eighteen states during the 2008 election, 
including all six states offering ubiquitous public financing to legislative candidates. 
Candidates received the first contact during the first week of October. Prepaid return 
envelopes were included, but the cover letter also directed respondents to an identical 
on-line version. Response rates in surveys of elite candidate populations tend to be 
low, often less than forty percent (e.g., Francia & Herrnson 2003; Howell 1982). To 
combat this trend, I sent electronic invitations to available addresses on October 19, 
November 11, and December 8, and mailed reminder postcards in mid-November.5 At 
that time, I assessed the response rate and total sample size of each state and re-sent 
                                                 
5 Electronic mail addresses were obtained for approximately 60% of the overall candidate population. 
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full survey packages to those that were under-performing.6 Finally, I contacted non-
respondents in those states by phone in mid-December, for a total of up to eight 
contacts.7  
 
The overall candidate population contained 2,971 candidates. Survey instruments 
solicited responses to questions regarding candidate attitudes toward their campaign, 
the electorate, and their competition. Each candidate was also asked to quantify the 
amount of time he or she personally devoted to various tasks in ten areas, including 
fundraising, public speeches, field activity, electronic campaigning, media relations, 
research, strategy, phoning voters, sending mailings, and the courting of interest 
groups.8 The response window remained open until December 31, 2008.  
 
State response rates ranged between a low of 23.7% in Rhode Island to 49.5% in 
Arizona. State-by-state response rates are contained in Table I-1. Overall, 1,022 
responses were received, for a response rate of 34.4%. As noted above, this rate is 
consistent with previous surveys of elite candidate populations, and there is no 
apparent discrepancy between observable characteristics of the population and those 
of the samples. Where necessary, I supplement these survey data with additional 
information such as candidate vote totals and financial information. I describe such 
supplemental data in each chapter where it is used.  
 
                                                 
6 Full packages were re-sent to candidates in Rhode Island, New Mexico, Delaware, and Colorado. 
While response rates were not problematic in publicly funded states, I re-sent full packages to Hawaii, 
Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Arizona in an effort to obtain as many responses as possible from those 
states. 
7  
8 The question was worded as follows: DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, what is your best 
estimate of how many hours you, yourself, spent engaged in the following activities? Please complete 
the table below, listing your NUMBER OF HOURS, and NOT A PERCENTAGE OF TIME. If you 
accepted public funding, do not include time spent qualifying for public money as part of the 
fundraising category. 
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Table I-1: State by State Response Rates 
 
 
State 
Candidate 
Population 
Response 
Rate 
 
State 
Candidate 
Population 
Response 
Rate 
 
 
Rhode Island 
 
114 
 
23.70% 
 
New Mexico 
 
101 
 
36.60% 
Michigan 207 24.60% Connecticut 239 38.50% 
Ohio 175 26.90% Maine 288 38.90% 
Iowa 170 28.20% Montana 183 40.40% 
West Virginia 151 28.50% Delaware 64 40.60% 
Missouri 244 29.10% Wisconsin 166 41.00% 
Vermont 240 31.70% Alaska 69 42.00% 
Minnesota 266 35.30% Colorado 121 42.10% 
Hawaii 78 35.90% Arizona 97 49.50% 
 
Finally, throughout the dissertation, but especially in the case study of Chapter 5, I 
report qualitative data derived from 16 candidate interviews in the wake of the 2006 
Arizona legislative election, conducted in-person at various locations throughout the 
state in January of 2007. The qualitative data are useful in providing a depth that the 
survey data do not always allow. I interviewed candidates of both major parties, for 
both legislative houses; respondents ranged in electoral success from primary losers to 
sitting members of the Arizona Legislature. I recorded interviews, transcribed 
responses, and coded for strategic and emotional concerns. 
 
Outline of Chapters 
 
This dissertation progresses as follows: In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of public 
funding programs for the six states in which public money is available to legislative 
candidates. In Chapter 2, I show that the acceptance of full funding affects the sort of 
tasks that fully funded candidates perform on a weekly basis, with significant 
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implications for voting behavior. Specifically, I find that candidates spend more time 
engaging the public in mobilization activities. In Chapter 3, I show that enhanced 
interaction between candidates and voters results in more votes being casts in districts 
where a publicly funded candidate is running. In Chapter 4, I develop a utility model 
to illustrate that full funding imparts higher costs on very conservative candidates, 
who must reconcile participation in programs like Clean Elections with their personal 
ideology and the politics of their districts. Based on this model, I argue that 
Democratic incumbents are less likely than Republicans to face a publicly funded 
challenger. I confirm this prediction with logistic regressions. Furthermore, I show 
that the partisan participation disparities may have practical effects, since an additional 
treatment effect derived from the matching exercise in Chapter 2 shows that fully 
funded candidates perform better. Finally, in Chapter 5 I examine the unintended 
consequences of matching funds provisions in Arizona. I find that the provisions of 
Clean Elections there create incentives for traditionally financed candidates to alter 
their spending patterns in an effort to game the system. In total, I find that full public 
funding has changed political campaigns, with ramifications for voting behavior; 
however, not all of these changes are definitively positive.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC FUNDING IN THE STATES  
 
“The name of the law helped to get it passed in the first place…who’s not for clean 
elections?” 
-Arizona Candidate 
 
As noted in the introduction, public financing systems display substantial variation in 
the source, size, and potential recipient of available funds. For instance, citizens in ten 
states are able to indirectly provide funding to parties, diverting money using check-
offs or add-ons on their income tax returns. Ten states also allow citizens to deduct 
political contributions from their state tax burden to encourage donations. Other states 
maintain funds for the sole purpose of directly supporting candidates. When they 
participate, candidates agree to abide by spending limits, but aside from that 
commonality the subsidy amount and the scope of eligible candidates varies 
dramatically. For example, Florida, Maryland, and Michigan restrict the availability of 
partial subsidies to gubernatorial candidates. North Carolina and New Mexico provide 
full public funding, but only for candidates for state judiciary and public regulatory 
board, respectively.  
 
For the remainder of this dissertation, I will discuss elections in six states—Arizona, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin—that provided direct 
subsidies to state legislative candidates in the 2008 election. Each of these states 
requires candidates to abide by spending limits, but the extent to which they fund 
candidates allows the publicly funded states to be classified into two groups: partial 
and full. Partial funding programs set the maximum subsidy payment at some 
percentage of the spending limit, but always less than half. Candidates in states 
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offering full funding receive subsidies approximately equal to spending limits. The 
practical difference between the two types is that fully funded candidates need not 
raise additional money once they qualify for the program, while partially funded 
candidates must raise the difference between the subsidy and the spending limit from 
private sources. I report the key features of the each state's public funding laws in 
Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Public Funding Regulations 
 Hawaii Minnesota Wisconsin 
    
Qualification raise $1,500 
$1,500 in amounts < 
$50 
raise $1,725 in 
amounts < $100 
 
Total Spending Limit app. $32,000* $31,400* $17,250* 
 
Maximum Subsidy 
15% of spending 
limit 
50% of spending 
limit 
45% of spending 
limit 
 
Maximum Matching 
Funds Distribution NA NA NA 
    
 
 Arizona Connecticut Maine 
    
Qualification 220 $5 donations 
$5,000 from 150 in-
district contributors 50 $5 donations 
 
Total Spending Limit $35,673** $41,000** $6,148** 
 
Maximum Subsidy $31,673 $35,000 $5,648 
 
Maximum Matching 
Funds Distribution up to 3X subsidy up to 2X subsidy up to 2X subsidy 
    
*Hawaii's spending limit $1.40 for each voter in a district. Minnesota and Wisconsin spending 
limits apply only if all candidates in a given race accept them. 
**In Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, candidates are allowed to raise $5,000, $6,000, and 
$500 prior to qualifying. Once they accept public funding, they may raise no additional 
money. 
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Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin offer partial funding. In Hawaii, public funding is 
paid for with a two dollar income tax check-off and is also supported in part by the 
state’s general fund. In order to be eligible for public money, state house candidates 
must raise $1,500 to show viability. The state’s tax laws are designed to ease the 
fundraising process for participating candidates: While contributions to any state 
campaign are tax-deductible up to $250, individuals may deduct up to $1,000 when 
they contribute to candidates who participate in the public funding program.9 Once 
they meet the eligibility benchmark, Hawaii’s state house candidates receive a one-
time matching payment equal to the $1,500 entry threshold and then receive dollar-
for-dollar matching funds up to the maximum subsidy amount, which is 15% of their 
expenditure limit. That limit is based on a population formula; candidates may spend 
$1.40 for every eligible voter in their election. In 2008, the average expenditure limit 
for each primary and general election was $16,050, for an aggregate limit of $32,100.  
 
Wisconsin candidates qualify for subsidies from the check off-supported fund by 
winning their primary and successfully soliciting $1,725 in individual contributions of 
less than one hundred dollars. Participating candidates for the state house agree not to 
spend more than $17,250 over the course of their campaign. Spending limitations 
apply only if all candidates in a given race have agreed to abide by them. Participating 
candidates are given equal grants regardless of district population. The grant amount 
depends on the monetary level of the fund, and it therefore varies by year. Candidates’ 
grant amounts are reduced for every dollar they receive from PAC sources, and in no 
instance may a candidate accept grants amounting to more than 45% of the spending 
limit.  
                                                 
9 The individual candidate deduction limit is in effect regardless of the candidate’s acceptance of 
spending limits. However, a contributor can donate the $250 to four separate candidates, taking a 
deduction for each, if they all agree to limit spending. 
 22 
 
Minnesota maintains a fund supported by a five dollar income tax check-off. The 
check-off itself is more complex than in many states; taxpayers can check a box to 
divert five dollars to either major party or to a general political campaign fund. 
Payments from the party fund are directed to candidates proportionally based on the 
amount of money that was checked off from citizens in their districts. Payments from 
the general fund are dispersed equally to candidates for various state offices, but the 
payments may never exceed one half of the candidate’s spending limit. In 2008 most 
participating house candidates limited their expenditures to $31,400. Like Wisconsin, 
Minnesota releases publicly funded candidates from spending limitations when they 
face an opponent who does not abide by them. However, Minnesota is the only state to 
account for the inevitable existence of disadvantages political neophytes face, 
adjusting its spending limit upward by ten percent for first-time candidates, and 
boosting the limitation by approximately $6,000 for candidates with closely contested 
primaries in which they won by a vote ratio of fewer than two-to-one.  
 
The flexibility of spending limits is a powerful inducement to accept public funding, 
but Minnesota has taken additional steps to ensure that its program remains viable: 
First, rather than rely solely on the check-off for revenue, Minnesota augments those 
receipts with an additional $1.2 million annual diversion from the state’s general fund. 
In addition, since 1991, the state has reimbursed individual contributors up to $50 if 
they donate to a candidate who agrees to abide by spending limits.10 That component 
of the law is intended to realize lower spending levels while facilitating easier 
candidate fundraising: candidates can ask contributors for a “loan” that the state 
treasury repays to donors within six weeks. 
                                                 
10 The reimbursement program was terminated in 2009 due to budget constraints. 
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Clean Elections: Full Public Funding 
 
In the 2000s, Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine implemented full funding systems. The 
successful passage of these laws is part of a larger national movement called “Clean 
Money, Clean Elections,” currently the most widespread campaign finance reform 
initiative at the state level. Under Clean Elections programs, candidates qualify for full 
public funding by raising a small amount of money, often from a predetermined 
number of individual contributors. Once they prove their viability in this fashion, 
Clean Elections candidates receive public subsidies sufficient to wage an entire 
primary and/or general contest. In return, participating candidates agree to raise no 
additional money and to abide by spending limits equal to their subsidy amounts. To 
encourage participation, candidates running against those who choose to opt out of the 
program receive matching funds for their opponents’ expenditures above the spending 
limit. The matching funds provisions are intended to guarantee financial parity for 
participating candidates in nearly all circumstances.  
 
Despite these broad similarities, regulations in each state create a unique environment. 
Passed as a public ballot initiative in 1998, Arizona’s Citizens’ Clean Elections Act 
was implemented in time for state elections in 2000. In 2008, Arizona’s legislation 
provided participating candidates with a subsidy of $19,382 for the general election 
and $12,921 for the primary, so long as candidates were able to demonstrate their 
viability by successfully soliciting at least 220 contributions of exactly five dollars. 
During the qualifying phases candidates may privately raise a relatively small amount 
(less than $4,000) of seed money, but if they ultimately accept public financing, 
candidates agree to forego any additional sources of finance and to spend only the sum 
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of the subsidy. If participants in the program find themselves outspent by traditionally 
funded opponents, Arizona matches the difference up to three times the subsidy 
amount. This provision is also true for the independent expenditures of outside 
individuals or groups made against participating candidates.  
 
Public funding in Maine is similar in nearly every regard. The Maine Clean Elections 
Act passed by voter referendum in 1996 and became active during the 2000 election 
cycle. To qualify in 2008, house candidates solicited fifty contributions of five dollars, 
after which they received subsidies of $1,504 for the primary and $4,144 for the 
general election when those races were contested.11 These amounts are equivalent to 
the average expenditure of candidates for the two previous primary and general 
elections. Candidates for the Maine House may raise and spend $500 in seed money 
before qualifying for the program. Like Arizona, Maine provides matching funds on 
behalf of participating candidates for expenditures above the subsidy amount made by 
opposition campaigns or independent groups. However, Maine matches only up to two 
times the original subsidy amount, making the program less generous than Arizona’s 
in this respect.  
 
Connecticut’s Citizens’ Election Program began in the  2008 legislative election; in 
addition to being to being the most complicated of the full funding laws, it is also the 
only functioning full funding scheme passed by legislative act. In comparison to the 
qualifying thresholds in Arizona and Maine, Connecticut’s bar is set high; state house 
candidates must raise at least $5,000 from a minimum of 150 contributors who reside 
in their district. The subsidy structure also differs from Arizona and Maine; payment 
amounts in Connecticut are more variable and depend upon the context of the race.  
                                                 
11 In uncontested races, the subsidy amounts were $512 and $1,658, respectively. 
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The subsidy amount for the primary depends upon the party’s strength in the district; 
where the percentage of a party’s registered voters exceeds that of the other party by 
20 percentage points, the district is considered to be “party-dominant” and the primary 
is acknowledged to be the de facto election. Recognizing that primary fields in party-
dominant districts are likely to be more crowded, the state allocates $25,000 to 
primary candidates of the dominant party and $10,000 for all others. General election 
subsidy amounts are also dependent upon the conditions of the race: Candidates facing 
major party opposition in the general election are eligible for further grants of $25,000 
for that campaign, while those facing either minor party or no opposition receive 
$15,000 and $7,500, respectively.  
 
To calculate spending limits, Connecticut divides the election into three phases. In the 
qualifying period when they are raising the initial $5,000, candidates are permitted to 
spend that entire amount plus up to $1,000 of their personal funds, for an aggregate 
initial spending limit of $6,000. Spending limits in the primary and general elections 
are equivalent to the candidate’s grant amount in each plus any unspent money 
remaining from the qualifying phase. Thus, for a major party candidate in a 
competitive district the overall spending limitation can be calculated as the sum of the 
primary and general grants plus the initial $6,000, or a total of $41,000.  
 
Connecticut also provides matching funds allocations to participating candidates 
whose traditionally funded opponents exceed the spending limit. Like Maine, 
Connecticut will match expenditures of opponents and opposing groups up to a limit 
of twice the total spending limit. However, rather than providing matching grants for 
every opponent expenditure above the spending ceiling, the state releases four lump 
sum grants equivalent to 25% of the spending limit. These grants are triggered when 
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opponent spending exceeds 100%, 125%, 150%, and 175% of the spending limit. 
With this money in hand, candidates are then restricted to matching only what their 
opponents have spent. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While each state’s program contains details that distinguish it from the others, the 
common element is that participating candidates in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine 
who meet uniform qualifying requirements are entitled to public subsidies that fund 
their entire campaign. Once they qualify, participating candidates in these states raise 
no money from private sources. Moreover, the states in theory guarantee an even 
playing field via matching grants that are triggered by opponent spending that exceeds 
the spending limit. Thus, the vast majority of publicly funded candidates in Arizona, 
Connecticut and Maine assume that they will compete at approximate financial parity. 
As I will consistently demonstrate in subsequent chapters, in terms of their capacity to 
change the political behavior of elites and masses alike, the difference between partial 
and full funding systems is a crucial one. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 
 
“The candidates that I knew this last election that (funded) traditionally were having 
fundraisers two or three times a week, while (publicly funded candidates) were going 
out knocking on doors. That, I think, is a big difference in how you spend your time. 
In an evening after work, I can knock on fifty to seventy doors of people who will 
actually go to the polls for me, as opposed to that candidate who has to go out and 
raise and spend two, three hours with lobbyists who often don’t even live in their 
district. Yeah, they’re going to get the money, but I’m the one going out and meeting 
the voters.”  
 
-Arizona Legislator12 
  
How does the introduction of full public election funding change the behavior of 
American candidates? In this chapter I show that the acceptance of full funding 
provides candidates with time flexibility sufficiently powerful to facilitate higher 
levels of direct interaction with citizens. I demonstrate that candidates have an 
incentive to accept public funding because it will allow them to forego fundraising in 
favor of other activities with clearer benefits. In other words, because they need not 
raise money, fully funded candidates in particular should be expected to pursue 
heightened interaction with voters. 
 
I report results from the survey of lower house legislative candidates in eighteen states 
fielded during the 2008 campaign. I construct a public interaction index from the 
number of weekly hours candidates reported devoting to field activity, phoning, 
preparing mailings, meeting with interest groups, media relations, speaking 
engagements, and electronic campaigning. Using a matching design comparing 
                                                 
12 I derive this and all subsequent quotes from in-person interviews conducted with Arizona candidates 
and legislators in January of 2007. 
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publicly funded candidates to those accepting only private funding, I find that 
candidates who accept full subsidies--and raise no private money--spend a higher 
percentage of their time engaged in public interaction activities.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: In the following section, I describe the theoretical 
basis for a hypothesis predicting that full public funding alters the manner in which 
candidates use their time. Next, I explain the matching design employed to gauge the 
effect of public funding on campaign time, followed by the results of that design. I 
close with a discussion of the implications of my findings for the continued evaluation 
of publicly funded elections. 
 
Public Funding and Voter Engagement 
 
Campaign field operations attempt to sway voters with a combination of media and 
direct solicitation, and the preponderance of the evidence to date suggests that 
genuine, personal appeals are more successful at stimulating turnout. Phone calls 
designed to get out the vote have little effect when they are delivered from large 
professional phone banks in both a non-partisan (Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber and 
Green 2001; McNulty 2005) and partisan (Panagopoulos 2009) context. This is likely 
due to the “low-quality” of the message delivered, since solicitations from 
professional phone banks are often hurried and impersonal (see: Nickerson 2007). 
There is evidence that radio advertising holds some promise of stimulating 
competition by bolstering challenger name recognition (Panagopoulos and Green 
2008), but a growing number of mobilization experiments have advanced the notion 
that well-targeted, more intimate messages are particularly effective.  
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For instance, a positive effect on turnout has been demonstrated when phone 
solicitations come from volunteers able to more effectively engage voters (Nickerson, 
Friedrichs, and King 2006; Nickerson 2006; Nickerson 2005; Ramirez 2005; Wong 
2005). Face-to-face canvassing techniques appear to be the most efficacious voter 
mobilization tools, particularly when delivered on-time to targeted populations 
(Kramer 1970; Gerber and Green 2000; Niven 2001a; Niven 2001b; Niven 2002; 
Green, Gerber, and Nickerson 2003; Michelson 2003; Bennion 2005; Hillygus 2005; 
Nickerson, Friedrichs, and King 2006; Parry et al. 2008). Recent work by Han (2009) 
bolsters the argument for high-quality appeals. In sum, when it comes to mobilizing 
support, the most productive campaigns will most likely be those able to make 
personal connections with voters.  
 
Yet despite the evidence that political campaigns are crucial forces of voter 
engagement in American elections, the rise of professionalized campaigns 
increasingly dependent upon expensive media operations has forced many candidates 
to choose between two distinct campaigns--one for money, and another for votes (see: 
Herrnson 2004). Given the explosion in campaign spending since the mid-1970s, it 
appears that the former is winning the battle for candidates' attention (see: Malbin, 
Ornstein, and Mann 2008). According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 218), the 
media-focused campaign has come at the expense of mass mobilization, and is 
partially responsible for the decline in voter turnout since the 1960s. Put another way, 
in modern, high-cost elections, “candidates and parties no longer pursue popular 
mobilization or evidence any serious interest in it” (Schier 2000, 124).  
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Even in lower-cost legislative races, candidates must still raise some money, and they 
no doubt feel a conflict between their “two campaigns.” The availability of public 
election funding has vast potential to resolve this tension, freeing candidates from their 
fundraising obligations and allowing them to focus solely on direct voter engagement. 
That said, not all funding programs are equally likely to alter candidate behavior. In 
Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, the partial subsidies amount to less than 25% of 
the average cost of a contested race, but in Arizona, Connecticut and Maine, publicly 
funded candidates can expect their payments to comprise more than 90% of average 
campaign expenses.13  
 
Thus, the candidate experience in a partially funded system is much the same as in a 
traditional, privately financed one: Challengers in particular must still persuade 
skeptical private donors to contribute, and so they must devote substantial time to 
fundraising. Given these conditions, it is not terribly surprising that little competitive 
change is apparent in states offering partial subsidies (Jones and Borris 1985; Mayer 
and Wood 1995; Malbin and Gais 1998, 136; but see: Donnay and Ramsden, 1995). In 
contrast, full funding programs appear to stimulate competition in legislative elections 
(General Accounting Office 2003; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006; Werner and 
Mayer 2007; Malhotra 2008). 
 
Despite building evidence of a link between full funding and lower victory margins, 
little is known about the manner in which public funding changes candidates' ability to 
mobilize voters. Francia and Herrnson (2003) confirmed that fully funded candidates 
spend less time raising money, which should not be surprising given that they are 
                                                 
13 I base this claim on data obtained from the National Institute on Money in State Politics, available at 
http://www.followthemoney.org 
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legally precluded from fundraising. However, Francia and Herrnson did not examine 
how public funding affects candidates' voter mobilization activities. Candidates are 
utility maximizing actors, and should be expected to pursue a strategy that will result 
in the highest number of votes. Compared even to partially financed challengers, those 
accepting full subsidies, who simultaneously enjoy financial parity with their 
opponents and the absence of fundraising as a necessary campaign task, are likely to 
wage a more visible, field-oriented campaign.  
 
A simple two-player game illustrates the idea that in most cases, utility-maximizing 
candidates will choose to accept full public funding in order to facilitate higher levels 
of public interaction. Table 2.1 contains the payoffs a challenger and incumbent in a 
fully funded state would expect from pursuing one of three discrete strategies: A fully 
funded campaign in which the candidate raises no money, a traditionally financed 
campaign with a field-oriented strategy, and a traditionally financed campaign with a 
high-dollar (media-focused) strategy.  
 
I assume that direct voter mobilization (m) always results in a higher return than 
raising money (f), but that incumbents are better able to convert time spent fundraising 
into votes (fI > fC) while challengers realize higher gains from mobilization (mC > mI). 
I also assume that the utility of a high dollar campaign is diminished when the 
opponent accepts full funding due to matching funds provisions, and I include a term q 
to discount fundraising utility accordingly. Finally, I include an ideology term i to 
account for diminishing utility of accepting public money as a candidate's fiscal 
ideology becomes more conservative, with  iv <  is <  il  │0< i ≤ 1 portraying the 
relative discount effect of ideology.14 
                                                 
14 See Chapter 4. 
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Table 2.1: Payoff Functions in a Two-Player Simultaneous Discrete Choice Game 
 
 
 
 
Challenger 
 
 Public Field 
 
Private High 
Dollar Private Field 
 Public Field bim, bim bim, aqf+bm bim, aqf+bm 
Incumbent Private High Dollar aqf+bm, bim af+bcm, af+bm af+bm, af+bm 
 Private Field aqf+bm, bim af+bcm, af+bm af+bm, af+bm 
     
 Time 
Allocation  
by Strategy:  
 
Campaign Time is a constant, 
M=a+b 
 
Public Field: b = M 
a: time spent 
 fundraising 
 
Private High 
Dollar: b = .2M 
b: time spent on voter  
mobilization Private Field: b= .5M 
 
Terms: 
 
Relative Utilities for Incumbents 
(i) and Challengers (c) 
  
f: utility from fundraising m > v, q=.5 
m: utility from direct voter mobilization fI > fC 
i: candidate ideology mC > mI 
q: opponent accepts public funding  
  
Ideology Values for Very Conservative (v), 
Somewhat Conservative (s), and Moderate/Liberal 
(l) Candidates: 
 
iv <  is <  il  
0 < i ≤ 1  
 
The Nash Equilibria resulting from the payoff functions in Table 2.1 for either a "very 
conservative" incumbent or a "very conservative" challenger are scenarios in which 
the liberal candidate accepts public funding while the conservative one runs a 
traditionally financed, field-oriented campaign. In other words, an extremely 
conservative personal ideology reduces the utility of public money in relation to a 
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privately financed campaign focused on direct mobilization. However, the discount 
resulting from a “somewhat conservative” ideology is insufficient to overcome the 
high utility of a publicly funded campaign, and Nash Equilibria for scenarios 
involving any combination of “somewhat conservative,” “moderate,” and “liberal” 
candidates are found when both candidates accept public funding. In those instances, 
the Nash Equilibria demonstrate that a publicly funded campaign focused on voter 
mobilization is preferable to one that focuses on a high-dollar media strategy.  
 
The aim of this game is not to advance a comprehensive model of strategic choices, 
but rather to support the notion that utility-maximizing campaigns pursue a strategy 
dependent on high quality voter contact. For all but very conservative candidates, the 
greatest payoff is derived from maximizing field contacts via the acceptance of full 
public funding. The resultant hypothesis is: 
 
H(3.1): Fully funded candidates will devote more of their weekly time to public 
interaction activities than candidates who fund only with private sources. 
 
Design: Public Funding and Public Interaction 
In this chapter I employ data from the candidate survey from 18 states described in the 
introduction. Where applicable, I supplement these survey data with the testimony of 
candidates collected during in-person interviews in the wake of the 2006 Arizona 
legislative election. 
 
While the survey yields promising data, a comparison of the behavior or publicly and 
privately funded candidates poses some challenges. For instance, candidate funding 
status is not likely to be random; as the game in a previous section shows, fiscal 
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conservatism is a crucial determinant of candidate participation, with very 
conservative candidates most likely to opt out. As such, the covariates are unlikely to 
be balanced between publicly and privately funded candidate groups because the 
receipt of public election funding necessarily implies that those groups are drawn from 
different populations. Accordingly, the causal effect of public funding on campaign 
time cannot be determined by simple testing of means or even multivariate regression 
(see: Sekhon 2009).  
 
If a causal argument is to be made, balance between the groups’ covariates must be 
achieved. A necessary condition for such balance is that observable characteristics 
have the same distribution in the traditionally and publicly funded groups. To achieve 
this balance, I employ a quasi-experimental design with a “treatment” group of 
publicly funded candidates and a “control” group of candidates who raised money 
exclusively from private sources. I compare time allocations across matched pairs 
consisting of one publicly funded candidate and one privately funded candidate, using 
one-to-one matching with replacement.15  
 
Matching is not always perfect; both exact matching (Arceneaux, Gerber, and Green 
2006) and propensity score matching (i.e. Smith and Todd 2005) have been shown to 
be sub-optimal methods for recovering the experimental benchmark in some 
conditions. With that in mind, I match pairs with Genetic Matching (see: Sekhon 
2008). A genetic matching algorithm balances the observed covariates between 
treatment and control groups (Mebane and Sekhon 1998; Sekhon and Mebane 1998). 
Genetic Matching, described by Sekhon (2006) and Diamond and Sekhon (2006) 
provides this balance and recovers the experimental benchmark. 
                                                 
15 I match with replacement to increase the chances of attaining superior covariate balance. 
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The outcome variable is the percentage of weekly campaign time that each candidate 
devoted to direct voter mobilization. This percentage is calculated from a public 
interaction index, an additive index of time measured in raw weekly hours or fractions 
thereof that candidates devoted to field activity, electronic campaigning, media 
relations, public speaking, mailings, phone calls, and group interaction.16 I seek the 
average treatment effect on the treated, or the effect of accepting public funding on the 
public interaction activities of candidates who accepted public funding. 
 
I perform the match with two important caveats. First, I believe that candidates 
operating in very different electoral environments are not comparable. For instance, a 
campaign in an urban district for the full-time Michigan legislature is likely to be quite 
different from one in rural Maine. I therefore pair each publicly funded state with two 
similar traditionally funded states. Criteria for selection as a comparison state include: 
the average cost of a legislative campaign, proximity within Squire’s (2007) index of 
legislative professionalization, average district population, chamber size, electoral 
time-line, and where possible, geographic location as a proxy for regional culture 
differences. Thus, I pair Colorado and New Mexico to Arizona, Rhode Island and 
West Virginia to Connecticut, Alaska and Delaware to Hawaii, Montana and Vermont 
to Maine, Iowa and Missouri to Minnesota, and Michigan and Ohio to Wisconsin. 
Each candidate in a treated state is matched only to a candidate from a paired control 
state. 
 
 
                                                 
1616 I exclude fundraising from the public interaction index. While the candidate must interact with the 
public for fundraising purposes, the fundraising audience is comprised of a narrow sector of the 
electorate with well-known, favorable preferences (see: Wilcox 2001). In other cases, funds may be 
solicited from individuals who live outside of the candidate’s district or state, negating any potential 
electoral benefit from fundraising activities. 
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Second, as described above I expect that the effects of partial and full public election 
funding on candidates’ public interaction activities will be markedly different. 
Accordingly, I perform separate matches for the two groups in order to allow the 
effects of each type of public funding to be compared. The samples from partially and 
fully funded states contain 99 and 169 publicly funded candidates, respectively, and 
each of these candidates is successfully matched.17  
 
I allow the genetic matching algorithm to operate without restriction on all covariates 
except for the factor variable that constrains candidate pairs to a three state group. I 
invoke exact matching on this variable to maximize the chances that unobservables 
dependent upon characteristics such as legislative professionalization, district 
population, and political culture are accounted for. Aside from that factor variable, the 
matching algorithm operates on data from nine others, including dichotomous 
indicators for candidate status as an incumbent, challenger, or open seat candidate, 
whether the candidate had been previously elected to any public office, male gender, 
Democratic partisan affiliation, and whether the candidate was white. In addition, I 
include an ordinal variable for the candidate’s work status at another job during the 
campaign: no job, part-time, or full-time. Finally, I add propensity scores to the 
matching algorithm reflecting a candidate's probability of treatment conditional on the 
variables listed above, calculated with a logistic regression. I seek balance both on 
these covariates and on the size of the legislative district in terms of population. 
 
 
                                                 
17 I delete list-wise 16 cases in which candidates did not complete the time component of the survey, 42 
cases in which candidates' reported campaign time exceeded the number of hours in one week, and 5 
cases in which candidates did not report their name or district, thus making information about their 
races irretrievable. Logistic regressions indicate that problematic and missing data are distributed 
randomly, and I am confident that the exclusion of these cases does not bias the substantive findings. 
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Table 2.2: Balance Tests Before and After Matching, By Sample 
 
Partial Public Funding 
Before Matching After Matching 
 
Public Traditional p-value Public Traditional p-value 
Incumbent 0.3131 0.311 0.9681 0.3131 0.3131 1 
Challenger 0.5556 0.4488 0.0686 0.5556 0.5556 1 
Open Seat 0.1313 0.2403 0.0111 0.1313 0.1313 1 
Experience 0.495 0.5265 0.591 0.495 0.495 1 
Work 1.242 1.134 0.2619 1.242 1.242 1 
Male 0.7273 0.6926 0.5113 0.7273 0.7273 1 
Democrat 0.6263 0.5795 0.4134 0.6262 0.6363 0.3173 
White 0.9697 0.9081 0.0122 0.9697 0.9697 1 
Dist. Pop. 38,498 53,313 0 38,498 39,236 0.7044 
Full Public Funding 
Before Matching After Matching 
 
Public Traditional p-value Public Traditional p-value 
Incumbent 0.3254 0.3308 0.9082 0.3254 0.3195 0.7058 
Challenger 0.3965 0.403 0.8917 0.3965 0.4083 0.4798 
Open Seat 0.2781 0.2662 0.7846 0.2781 0.2722 0.7058 
Experience 0.6154 0.5057 0.0246 0.6154 0.5976 0.4056 
Work 1.213 1.267 0.5127 1.213 1.219 0.5641 
Male 0.5976 0.654 0.2402 0.5976 0.5976 1 
Democrat 0.6391 0.5323 0.0274 0.6391 0.6686 0.336 
White 0.9586 0.9088 0.0346 0.9586 0.9586 1 
Dist. Pop. 37,068 33,321 0.4274 37,068 34,105 0.576 
 
All publicly funded candidates were successfully matched. p-values are calculated with 
two-sample t-tests before matching and paired t-tests after. 
 
Table 2.2 contains the mean values of the covariates on which I seek balance for 
publicly and traditionally financed candidates, both before and after matching. While 
the p-values in this table cannot be used for formal hypothesis testing regarding the 
effect of the treatment (see: Sekhon 2008), they do provide a meaningful indication of 
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how well the covariates in each sample are aligned. On the whole, for both partial and 
full funding, genetic matching results in a sample with superior overall balance. The 
smallest p-value in the partial and full groups is .3173 and .3360 respectively, a 
marked improvement over those obtained before matching. With generally high p-
values, I am confident that the matched pairs are well-balanced.  
 
Findings: Public Money and Public Interaction 
Summary statistics derived from the candidate survey lend preliminary support to the 
hypothesis that full funding leads to enhanced public interaction. Figure 1 depicts the 
percentage of time that candidates devoted to public interaction activities, separated by 
state tier and candidate funding status.18 In all cases, candidates in the publicly funded 
group reported devoting higher percentages of their campaign time to public 
interaction activities than privately funded candidates within their match tier. The 
pattern apparent in Figure 1 is suggestive of publicly funded candidates investing the 
time they would have spent fundraising into direct voter mobilization activities. 
 
However, the pattern in Figure 1 is insufficient to allow causal conclusions because 
observable individual differences are not taken into account. I now turn to the results 
of the genetic matching exercise. The estimated treatment effects are reported in Table 
2.3, and results are consistent with theoretical expectations. With a mean near zero and 
a standard error above 2, partial public funding programs do not lead to candidates 
devoting higher percentages of their campaign time to public interaction. In terms of 
stimulating direct voter mobilization efforts, partial funding does not have an effect.19  
                                                 
18 Candidates are not separated into publicly and privately funded groups in Minnesota and Hawaii 
because only 1 respondent participated in Hawaii's public funding program, while only 2 respondents 
opted out in Minnesota. In those states, I report overall mean percentages only. 
19 Given that the financial realities partially funded candidates face typically require them to raise 
money from private sources throughout the election, this result is not surprising.  
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Figure 1: Mean Percentage of Candidate Time Devoted to Public Interaction, By 
State and Funding Status 
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The picture in fully funded elections is markedly different. As the entries in Table 2.3 
indicate, the acceptance of full funding such as that in Arizona, Connecticut, and 
Maine, causes an increase of nearly 10 percentage points in the proportion of time 
candidates spend directly engaging voters. With a standard error of 1.86, this result is 
both highly significant and consistent with available evidence, prior analysis, and the 
theoretical expectations outlined above: Full funding leads to higher levels of public 
interaction.  
 
Table 2.3: Genetic Matching Results: Average Treatment 
Effects on the Treated Groups, By Funding Program Type 
Acceptance of Acceptance of 
Partial Funding Full Funding 
Treated Observations 99 169 
Average Effect 0.08 9.76* 
Standard Error (2.29) (1.86) 
Treatment effects expressed as a percentage of weekly campaign time. 
* Statistically Significant, p<.05 
 
 
Further testing shows that inference on the treatment effect is robust to bias resulting 
from potential unobservable differences between candidate groups. When subjected to 
a sensitivity analysis using Rosenbaum bounds, the p-value associated with the 
treatment effect remains significant at α= .05 until Γ = 2.6 (see: Rosenbaum 2002; 
Keele 2009).20 In other words, the inference from the matching exercise remains valid 
                                                 
20 Keele's rbounds package is designed for matching without replacement; its effectiveness for matching 
exercises with replacement is unknown at present. While matching without replacement does diminish 
the balance between treatment and control groups in this case, the Γ value at which the p-value loses 
significance is a fairly comparable 2.1. 
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until the odds of a candidate accepting public money are 2.6 times higher because of a 
difference in unobservable traits between public and traditional candidates.21 In 
tandem with the fact that the factor variable in the matching algorithm constrains 
matches to similar states, the Rosenbaum bounds on the p-value yield a high level of 
confidence that this inference is not driven by unobserved bias.22 In short, the subsidy 
size matters; full funding alters the flexibility of both financial resources and candidate 
time. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Almost all of the literature on the subject of full public election funding programs like 
Clean Elections evaluates their ability to improve competition. The results are 
encouraging on that front (see: Chapter 2; Malhotra 2008; Mayer, Werner and 
Williams 2005), and given that combating stagnant competition is a stated goal of the 
reform movement, these studies are valuable. However, the findings I report in this 
paper show that diminished victory margins are only one of several major effects of 
full funding, and the most powerful benefit of programs like Clean Elections might be 
their ability to alter the manner in which candidates use their time. Simply stated, full 
funding facilitates changes in basic campaign strategy, enhancing the ability of 
campaigns to directly engage voters.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The point estimate for size of the treatment effect becomes zero-bracketed at Γ = 1.1. Thus, the size 
of the effect is less robust to unobserved bias than the fact that there is a difference. 
22 Examining raw public interaction hours as the outcome variable does not change the substantive 
finding: Fully funded candidates devoted 6 more hours per week to public interaction activities, which 
is statistically significant with a Γ value of 1.5. 
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I demonstrate here that subsidized elections are certainly different. A difference in 
weekly public interaction time of nearly ten percentage points is a substantial one, 
particularly since these data show that a typical candidate's time commitment in a long 
campaign season approximates that of a full-time job. Fully funded candidates' 
enhanced mobilization capability translates to at least hundreds, and possibly 
thousands of high-quality voter contacts that would not have otherwise occurred. 
These personal contacts happen even in districts where the candidates stand no chance 
of winning, and in districts where full subsidies are present, more citizens vote. It is 
hard to argue that these are not positive changes, and if there is value in enhancing the 
visibility of political discourse, then full public election funding certainly creates a 
public good.  
 
It is worth noting that for some candidates, the engagement effect persisted as they 
continued to seek new forms of civic involvement even after the campaign's 
conclusion. This trend seems particularly strong among candidates who ran in 
decidedly unfriendly districts and who knew from the beginning that they were 
destined to lose. For instance, one challenger who badly lost harbored little bitterness, 
instead viewing the experience as a generally positive one:  
 
(With public funding) you get a lot of decent people out there running. And the other 
thing is, you’ll get people to do other stuff. I mean, I ran for office, so I’m thinking, 
O.K., what else should I do? You know, it gets people involved. And there’s 
something to be said for these publicly funded people to run these losing races. 
 
The response above is typical of most challengers in safe districts, who believe that 
full funding fueled energetic campaigns even under the most unfavorable political 
conditions. These informants' conceptions of “better performance” are not confined 
solely to electoral results; they tend to take a broader view of their campaign, noting 
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its effects on civic engagement and the availability of political information. Many 
fully funded candidates report feeling that public money afforded them a unique 
opportunity to stage a serious public discourse that would not otherwise have 
occurred. Fully funded challengers seem to seriously reflect upon their ability to 
present voters with a choice, and view the dialog they have with voters as a personal 
contribution to the quality of their state’s democracy. This is a unique situation in 
American politics, and stands in stark contrast to the prevailing notion of selective 
mobilization efforts that are deployed only in close races (see: Rosenstone and Hansen 
1993, 210).  
 
As one informant noted, “(Accepting public money) was the difference between 
(having no candidate and) being able to get out there…(to) say the things that needed 
to be said about making changes in the system and why I needed to be involved in this 
process.” The corresponding potential for broader citizen participation is a worthwhile 
end with normative implications for American politics. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
VOTING BEHAVIOR 
 
“Legislative elections, at least in Arizona, are generally decided by who can knock on 
the most doors. When we knocked off the incumbent in my first race, so many people 
said, ‘I voted for you because you came to my door.’” 
 
-Arizona Candidate 
 
Recent work in political science has demonstrated a link between participation and 
structural factors such as the complexity of registration requirements (e.g., Wattenberg 
2002) and redistricting (Hayes and McKee 2009). Yet, the relationship between 
campaign finance systems and the political behavior of voters has not been fully 
considered. In this chapter I show that the heightened engagement between voters and 
publicly funded candidates translates to more ballots cast in those races. My analysis 
links changes in campaign finance law to mass voter behavior, building on previous 
work finding that structural changes have ramifications for political participation in 
the United States (e.g., Hayes and McKee 2009) and beyond (e.g., Franklin 2004). 
Accordingly, I argue that the evaluative framework used to judge campaign finance 
policy in general, and public election funding specifically, should be broadened 
beyond a discussion of financial numbers and electoral competition to problems of 
political engagement and voting behavior in the United States. 
 
I analyze voter roll-off trends in Connecticut and Maine state legislative races both 
before and after the implementation of public funding. Following a difference-in-
differences design with a “treatment group” comprised of districts where a publicly 
funded candidate was present, I find that ballot roll-off in treated districts is lower by 
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about 1.5 percentage points in Maine and 2 points in Connecticut, a factor of about 
20% in each state. These findings suggest that public election funding has implications 
for mass political behavior. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: In the following section, I detail my expectation that 
the presence of a fully funded candidate will increase the likelihood of voters casting 
ballots in down-ticket elections. Next, I describe the difference-in-differences models 
used to examine the relationship between full funding and voting behavior, and the 
resultant findings. I close with a discussion of the results. 
 
The Link to Voting Behavior 
Given the findings in the previous chapter, the natural second question is how the 
availability of public money also changes voting behavior. In the context of relatively 
low-information state legislative elections, the classic expressions of turnout, such as 
the number of votes cast divided by the number of voting-age or voting-eligible 
citizens, are not the ideal place to look for altered voting patterns. Even in the fully 
funded state legislative elections, it is unrealistic to assume that down-ticket races 
alone can affect the number of citizens who turn out to vote. That said, while enhanced 
engagement between legislative candidates and the public may not drive voters to the 
polls, it should increase the likelihood that citizens will cast ballots in the legislative 
election after voting for higher-profile offices. In other words, the presence of a fully-
funded candidate in a state house race should diminish voter roll-off.  
 
Roll-off occurs when voters stop marking their ballots for lower offices; on a given 
ballot a vote will be cast for one or several of the top races but not for those further 
down the ticket. Roll-off is a difficult phenomenon to reconcile with the classic 
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rational choice voting models (e.g. Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968) which 
predict that citizens will vote when the cost of doing so approaches zero, as it does 
when a voter is already in the booth. However, when voters know little or nothing 
about the candidates in a given race, the odds that they will make an “incorrect” 
decision increase. Most partisan voters in low-information elections can use party 
labels as reliable cues, even if they know little else about the candidates, but 
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) demonstrate that when non-partisan voters face a 
great deal of uncertainty, they have an incentive to abstain from voting and delegate 
the choice to more informed citizens. Thus, in low-visibility elections, information is a 
crucial commodity. 
 
Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto (2000) found that voters approach ballots in 
much the same way as a test, abstaining when they lack sufficient knowledge to make 
a clear decision. Information in professional, media-heavy campaigns is easier to 
obtain; yet the attention that top campaigns receive makes it even more difficult for 
less-visible candidates to provide voters with many of the useful heuristics they use to 
make a decision, such as incumbency, occupational background, or endorsements 
(e.g., Lau and Redlawsk 2001; McDermott 2005). In less visible elections such as 
those for most state assemblies then, higher levels of interaction between candidates 
and the public hold great promise to lower the information costs voters face, thereby 
increasing the probability that citizens will express a preference in those contests. 
Particularly considering the findings of the previous chapter, this leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
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H(4.1): The presence of a fully funded candidate in a legislative race diminishes voter 
roll-off. 
 
Design: Public Funding and Voting Behavior 
 
Unfortunately, roll-off from 2008 presidential ballots cannot be examined within the 
context of the genetic matching exercise in the previous chapter due to the 
unavailability of 2008 precinct returns in some states and structural issues such as 
multimember districts in others.23 I therefore employ a difference-in-differences 
approach to examine ballot roll-off patterns in contested Maine and Connecticut 
legislative elections, before and after implementation of their Clean Elections 
programs.24 
 
Legislative districts serve as the unit of analysis. Both Connecticut and Maine have 
151 single-member lower house districts, making them ideal venues for examination 
of roll-off trends in a fairly large number of cases.25 Clean Elections became effective 
for the 2000 election in Maine and for the 2008 campaign in Connecticut. 
Accordingly, I compare the difference in roll-off between 2000 and 1996 in the 
former, and between 2008 and 2004 in the latter. These years facilitate a panel 
analysis; each election before and after public funding had a contested presidential 
race at the top of the ballot, and there was no intervening redistricting in either case.26 
                                                 
23 The implications of the former are obvious, but the latter problem causes concern since a small 
percentage of voters in multimember districts may be unaware that they are able to vote for more than 
one candidate. The resulting undervotes would bias roll-off upward in states with multimember 
districts, confounding attempts to compare roll-off between single- and multi-member races. 
24 I obtained precinct election returns from the websites of the Maine and Rhode Island Secretaries of 
State, and a public information request submitted to the Connecticut Office of Legislative Research. 
25 Arizona's two-member districts and small legislature create problems of noise and micronumerosity, 
making it a less than ideal case. 
26 Gubernatorial elections such as those in 1998 and 2006 generally draw fewer voters; citizens who do 
vote when no presidential candidate is on the ballot may be more knowledgeable or committed, and so 
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To calculate the difference-in-differences estimator, I exploit an opportunity created 
by the rules that govern candidate participation in public funding programs. In Buckley 
v. Valeo (1976), the United States Supreme Court equated campaign spending to 
political speech, rendering mandated spending limits unconstitutional. Because 
distribution of public money is conditional on acceptance of spending limits, candidate 
participation is optional, allowing the division of districts into “treatment” and 
“control” groups. I assign districts to the treatment group if at least one candidate 
accepted public funding during the election when it became available and to the 
control group if all candidates raised money solely from private sources in that year. 
Following the logic of the difference-in-differences design, I assume that the roll-off 
trend in the control group approximates the mean of what would have occurred in the 
absence of public funding, establishing a counterfactual baseline for comparison. 
 
The process of group assignment is straightforward in Maine, where at least one 
candidate accepted public funding in 58 of 151 legislative districts during the 2000 
general election.27 I calculate roll-off only from precincts in which ballots were cast 
for a single legislative district; approximately 160 precincts were therefore excluded, 
but well over 500 remain. In 19 legislative districts, ballots were counted only from 
precincts that overlap multiple districts; as such, no usable roll-off figure can be 
calculated from those districts. Of the remaining 132 districts, 91 had competitive 
elections in both 1996 and 2000. These districts remain in the final analysis, with 40 in 
the treatment group.  
                                                                                                                                            
roll-off can not be compared between gubernatorial and presidential election years. A stand-alone 
analysis of gubernatorial roll-off may seem possible in Maine, which is unique among states in that it 
redistricts for the third election of every decade. However, gubernatorial candidates were also eligible 
to accept public funding in 2002, when the public fund released over $1.2 million to the contest for 
governor. I therefore do not estimate difference-in-differences for the 1998 and 2002 Maine elections. 
27 I obtained precinct-level election returns from the website of the Maine Secretary of State: 
http://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/ 
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The construction of a sufficiently large control group is more difficult in Connecticut, 
where 52 districts saw contested elections in both 2004 and 2008. However, at least 
one major-party candidate accepted public funding in all but 2 of those districts, 
yielding a control group too small to support statistical inference. Following Card and 
Krueger (1994), who examined the effect of minimum wage changes on employment 
in New Jersey fast-food establishments with a control group of Eastern Pennsylvania 
restaurants, I address this issue by constructing a control group of General Assembly 
districts from Rhode Island. As noted in Chapter 3, both the legislative elections and 
political demographics of Connecticut and Rhode Island are similar in a number of 
important areas, and I expect their geographic proximity to mitigate any issues 
surrounding their political culture or regional political trends.28 Since public funding is 
not available in Rhode Island, I include as controls all 30 Rhode Island assembly 
districts that saw contested elections in both 2004 and 2008, yielding 50 treated and 32 
untreated districts in the Connecticut model. 
 
While I anticipate that treatment will be a significant determinant of lower roll-off in 
both Maine and Connecticut, I expect that factors other than full public funding will 
affect ballot roll-off as well. For instance, expensive contests spawn more media 
advertising and direct mail, which should raise awareness of the candidates among the 
electorate. The presence of either a third-party candidate or an incumbent in a race 
might also effect roll-off, since incumbent name recognition provides a decision 
heuristic for some voters (see: Lau and Redlawsk 2001) while others may feel that 
minor parties are more closely aligned with their views. Finally, the percentage of 
African-American voters in the electorate has been shown to be positively correlated 
                                                 
28 Paired t-tests confirm that there are no significant differences between the model covariates from 
Connecticut and Rhode Island districts in their 2004 condition, which improves confidence in Rhode 
Island as a control state. 
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with roll-off in a number of state and municipal elections (see: Vanderleeuw and 
Engstrom 1987; Darcy and Schneider 1989; Vanderleeuw and Utter 1993; 
Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002; Feig 2007). Particularly for the Connecticut model, which 
includes data from a 2008 presidential contest that saw the election of an African-
American president, the racial composition of a district might affect roll-off trends. 
 
Following these considerations, I calculate the following panel difference in 
differences model from data in Maine as well as Connecticut and Rhode Island to 
investigate the effect of public funding on voter roll-off between Election 1 (when 
public funding was available) and Election 0 (when all elections were privately 
financed), holding relevant covariates constant: 
 
∆ YD = σ + β1X1 + ∆β2X2D  + ∆β3X3D + ∆β4X4D + β5X5 + ϵ  
 
Where: 
 
∆ YD  is the difference between roll-off in Election 1 and Election 0 for District D 
 
X1 is a dummy variable coded 1 for treatment (i.e., at least one candidate in the district 
accepted public funding) and 0 for control 
 
X2D is the inflation-adjusted difference in total money raised in District D between 
Election 1 and Election 0 
 
X3D is the difference in the number of minor party candidates on the ballot in District 
D between Election 1 and Election 0 29 
 
X4D is the difference in the number of incumbents running in District D between 
Election 1 and Election 0 30 
 
X5 is the percentage of African-Americans living in the district.  
                                                 
29 I consider the Green Independent Party a major party in Maine. 
30 Since both states employ single-member districts, values of this variable range from -1 to 1. 
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Thus, the β1 coefficient in Model 1 is the treatment effect on the treated holding 
funding, minor party involvement, incumbency, and racial composition constant.  
 
I express roll-off as: 
 
R = 100(1-(L/P) 
 
Where R is ballot roll-off, L is the number of votes cast for state legislature in a given 
district, and P is the number of votes for president. Lower roll-off values are indicative 
of a higher percentage of voters who cast ballots in both the presidential and 
legislative races. I obtained summary financial information from the website of the 
National Institute on Money in State Politics,31 census information on Maine's 
legislative districts from Barone, Lilley, and DeFranco (1998), and demographic 
information in Connecticut and Rhode Island from Lilley et al. (2007). Table 3.1 
contains descriptive statistics from the data used to construct the models for both 
states, tabulated by treatment and control groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 http://www.followthemoney.org 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Maine Control Group, N=51 
Dependent Variable: Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Difference in Rolloff 0.92 2.87 -3.7 9.78 
Independent Variables: 
Difference in Money Raised 65.48 9008.93 -26,220.62 21,564.99 
Difference in Number of 3rd Party 
Candidates .06 .40 -1.00 1.00 
Difference in Number of Incumbents 0.25 0.66 -1.00 1.00 
Perc. of African American Population 0.31 1.05 0.00 7.00 
Maine Treatment Group, N=40 
Dependent Variable: Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Difference in Rolloff -.06 1.89 -5.69 4.18 
Independent Variables: 
Difference in Money Raised -2,712.59 8,518.32 -27,144.10 11,600.51 
Difference in Number of 3rd Party 
Candidates -.025 .42 -1.00 1.00 
Difference in Number of Incumbents -0.025 0.77 -1.00 1.00 
Perc. of African American Population 0.38 0.74 0.00 3.00 
Connecticut Control Group, N=32 
Dependent Variable: Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Difference in Rolloff .70 1.91 -3.2 7.8 
Independent Variables: 
Difference in Money Raised -6459 21,500 -53,800 39,508 
Difference in Number of 3rd Party 
Candidates 0.03 0.65 -1.00 2.00 
Difference in Number of Incumbents 0 0.51 -1.00 1.00 
Perc. of African American Population 6.56 8.45 0.40 37.2 
Connecticut Treatment Group, N=50 
Dependent Variable: Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Difference in Rolloff -1.67 3.06 -7.14 8.34 
Independent Variables: 
Difference in Money Raised 9,586 35,683 -74,656 103,161 
Difference in Number of 3rd Party 
Candidates -0.16 0.62 -2.00 1.00 
Difference in Number of Incumbents 0 0.53 -1.00 1.00 
Perc. of African American Population 8.20 9.39 .7 42.40 
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Findings: Public Funding an d Voter Behavior 
Maine 
Table 3.2 contains coefficients and robust standard errors from the OLS regression 
models used to calculate the difference-in-differences estimators for each state, 
holding relevant covariates constant.32 As anticipated, the model reflects a negative 
relationship between fundraising and roll-off; when candidates in a given district 
collectively raised more money in 2000 than in 1996, roll-off declined. This result is 
consistent with expectations; more money in the election leads to more advertising, 
staff, and mailings, all of which help to raise awareness of candidates among the 
electorate. However, while statistically significant, the magnitude of the relationship 
between campaign money and roll-off does not appear to be particularly meaningful in 
the context of a Maine election. For instance, the model coefficients indicate that each 
additional $1,000 raised would decrease roll-off by only about one-tenth of one 
percentage point, but according to the National Institute on Money in State Politics, 
the average candidate for the Maine House spent less than $4,000 in the 2000 
campaign.33  
 
Given that Maine operates with single-member districts, the coefficient for the 
difference in the number of incumbents can be interpreted as the effect of an 
incumbent being present in the race. The model shows a relatively strong incumbency 
effect, as the presence of an incumbent reduces ballot roll-off by about three-fifths of a 
percentage point. This is also consistent with expectations, since incumbent name 
recognition may serve as an informational shortcut for voters.  
                                                 
32 While there is no evidence of heteroskedasticity, I report robust standard errors to adjust for any non-
random error variance, but this does not change the sign or significance of any of the regression 
coefficients. 
33 http://www.followthemoney.org 
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Neither the coefficients for the percentage of African-American residents nor the 
number of third-party candidates achieve significance in the Maine model. Given the 
dynamics of the 1996 and 2000 presidential races, it is not particularly surprising that 
racial composition did not affect roll-off changes in Maine; the average proportion of 
African-Americans in Maine's house districts is less than 0.5% (see: Barone, Lilley, 
and DeFranco 1998) and there is no obvious reason to believe that African-Americans 
should have mobilized differently in the two years. Somewhat more puzzling is the 
failure of the coefficient for differences in the presence of third-party candidates to 
achieve significance, since the presence of a minor party candidate might encourage 
some citizens to vote who may otherwise have abstained. That observation aside, all 
control variables are signed in the expected direction, which should improve 
confidence in the results for the remainder of the regression.  
 
I now turn to the treatment dummy variable, which is the predictor of interest with 
regard to Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for the treatment dummy indicates that that the 
presence of a fully funded candidate in the legislative race decreases roll-off by 1.53 
percentage points, holding all other covariates constant. In short, the model for Maine 
conforms to the expectations of Hypothesis 2: roll-off is lower in districts where at 
least one candidate accepted public funding. This finding supports the notion that a 
higher level of interaction between campaigns and citizens leads to more voters 
casting ballots in races when a publicly funded candidate is present. 
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Table 3.2: OLS Regression Coefficients, Calculation of Difference in Differences 
Estimators of Voter Roll-off in Contested Races, Connecticut and Maine 
 
Connecticut Maine 
Treatment: Presence of Public Funding -2.1* -1.53* 
(.56) (.46) 
Difference in Money Raised by Candidates in District (in 
Thousands) -.024* -.10* 
(.0117) (.02) 
Difference in Number of Minor Party Candidates on Ballot .34 -.39 
(.53) (.58) 
Difference in Presence of Incumbent .76 -.63* 
(.71) (.27) 
Percentage of African Americans in District .097* .71 
(.046) (.40) 
Constant -.11 .88* 
(.45) (.33) 
N 82 91 
R2 .33 .31 
RMSE 2.45 2.16 
F-Statistic 6.36 9.37 
*p<.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Dependent variable for Connecticut is the difference in 2008 roll-off and 2004 roll-off. For 
Maine, the difference is between 2000 and 1996. The control group for Connecticut is 
constructed from Rhode Island House Districts. 
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Connecticut 
 
Table 3.2 also contains coefficients and robust standard errors for the model used to 
calculate difference-in-differences in Connecticut, using Rhode Island districts as a 
control group. Like those for Maine, the results from the Connecticut model show that 
the presence of more money in a district race diminishes roll-off. The coefficient for 
fundraising predicts a roll-off decrease of about 0.025 percentage points for each 
additional one thousand dollars raised in a district. Racial composition is also a 
significant predictor of roll-off trends in Connecticut and Rhode Island, where the 
model predicts that a one percentage-point increase in African American residents 
would raise roll-off by about one-tenth of one percentage point from 2004 to 2008. 
This finding agrees with previous research that has found higher roll-off in districts 
with more African-Americans (e.g., Vanderleeuw and Engstrom 1987; Darcy and 
Schneider 1989; Feig 2007). Particularly given the dynamics at play in the 2008 
presidential election, which saw unprecedented turnout from African-American voters 
(see: McDonald 2008), the significance of this coefficient for the Connecticut model 
aligns with expectations.  
 
Like the model for Maine, changes in the number of minor-party candidates on the 
Connecticut and Rhode Island ballots did not result in altered roll-off patterns. 
However, in contrast to results from Maine, the presence of an incumbent is not a 
significant predictor of ballot roll-off changes in Connecticut and Rhode Island. It is 
unclear whether this failure results from disparities of geography, time, or some 
mixture of both. One possible explanation is that “change” was a major theme of the 
2008 presidential campaign, which may have diminished the informational value of 
incumbency; however, these data do not allow sound conclusions on this question. 
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Regardless, the coefficient for the treatment dummy variable in the Connecticut model 
leads to no such ambiguity: It is negative and significant, indicating that treatment 
decreases roll-off by 2.1 percentage points, holding all other covariates constant. This 
finding is consistent both with the expectations of Hypothesis 2 and the results of the 
model from Maine. In tandem, the results from the two states strongly suggest that the 
presence of a publicly-funded candidate affects mass voting behavior. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I present evidence that the presence of a publicly funded candidate in a 
given district raises levels of voter participation in down-ticket elections. Yet, my 
findings do not allow a definitive conclusion with regard to the specific casual 
mechanism functioning between the exposure to the candidate and the decision to 
vote. One answer might be that, as Wattenberg, McAllister, and Salvanto (2000) 
suggest, increased interaction between candidates and voters simply lower voters' 
information costs, providing them with a political education sufficient to allow a clear 
choice. Another possible explanation is that when voters meet candidates, the personal 
connection leads to higher levels of mass political efficacy, which has been shown to 
be particularly important in reducing roll-off among African-Americans (Vanderleeuw 
and Utter 1993; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002). Future work should seek to untangle that 
question.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PARTISAN COSTS AND COMPETITION IN CLEAN ELECTIONS STATES  
 
“Things are different now. Some very conservative Republicans (are feeling) a little 
bit of pressure after coming through a very close election when they should not have 
even had a race.” 
 
-Arizona Legislator 
 
The potential for public funding to enhance competition is one of the most widely 
touted benefits of such reforms. Advocates reason that closing the financial gap 
between incumbents and challengers will increase competition in American elections, 
and academic analysis has confirmed that the subsidy size is a crucial element in 
achieving these goals. Partial grants have proven ineffective in curbing spending in 
New York City municipal elections (Kraus, 2006) and Minnesota state campaigns 
(Schultz, 2002), although Mayer & Wood (1995) found some evidence of success in 
Wisconsin. Moreover, at least three studies have identified little competitive change in 
states offering partial subsidies (Jones and Borris 1985; Mayer and Wood 1995; 
Malbin and Gais 1998, 136). Donnay and Ramsden (1995) describe some competitive 
improvement in Minnesota, but the preponderance of the evidence suggests that partial 
subsidies do little to enhance electoral competition. 
 
In contrast, a number of studies have found that full public funding such as that in 
Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine alters the composition of the candidate pool, changes 
campaign activities, and improves competition. For instance, La Raja (2008) found 
evidence that full funding provides an incentive for candidate entry in Connecticut, 
and Werner and Mayer (2007) found that women in Maine and Arizona house races 
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are significantly more likely to accept public money than men.34 Francia and Herrnson 
(2003) demonstrated that fully funded candidates spend significantly less time raising 
money during their campaign. Finally, since full funding programs have been active in 
Arizona and Maine, studies have consistently noted higher levels of competition, 
especially in incumbent-contested races (see: Government Accountability Office 
2003; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006; Werner and Mayer 2007; Malhotra 2008).  
 
Despite building evidence that Clean Elections enhances competition, political 
scientists have made few advances in understanding the manner in which candidate 
ideology affects incentives for participation in public funding systems. In this chapter, 
I confirm previous findings of enhanced electoral competition in incumbent-contested 
elections when the challenger accepts full funding. However, I also demonstrate that 
candidates who possess a very conservative fiscal ideology face higher costs of public 
funding participation than those who are fiscally moderate or liberal. If Democrats are 
more likely to fall into the latter category, then the findings presented in this chapter 
suggest that the benefits of public funding may accumulate disproportionately to 
Democratic incumbents. 
 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section, I place the 
reform logic in the context of a strategic challenger utility model. I then disaggregate 
the cost components of that model, allowing costs of participation to vary with 
candidates' fiscal ideology. That exercise reveals that a very conservative fiscal 
ideology creates political and emotional costs that make participation in public 
funding a suboptimal choice. Given the typical ideological orientations of Democrats 
                                                 
34 A 2008 study by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials found little 
evidence of increased numbers of Latino candidates after the implementation of Clean Elections. 
 60 
and Republicans, it is reasonable to expect that incumbents of the former party should 
be less likely to face a publicly funded major party challenger. Next, I confirm the 
predictions from the utility model with logistic regressions showing that Republicans 
are more likely to encounter a publicly funded challenger. Finally, I employ the 
genetic matching exercise from Chapter 2 to show that publicly funded candidates 
receive a higher share of the general election vote. I close with a consideration of the 
practical ramifications of these findings. 
 
Citizen-Candidates and Campaign Utility 
 
In considering the utility of running with public funding, the literature on candidate 
entry provides a useful framework from which to begin. The classic entry models 
portray prospective candidates as strategic, utility-maximizing actors who weigh the 
costs of running against the expected benefits of the office and likely success of the 
campaign. Black (1972) described the challenger entry decision as a function of 
campaign utility, expressed as:  
 
u(O)=(PB)-C 
 
Where:  
 
u(O) is the utility of the office 
 
B is the benefit an individual receives from being elected 
 
P is the individual’s estimated probability that he/she will be elected 
 
C is the cost of getting elected 
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While recent work has considered the manner in which potential challengers view the 
benefits of higher office (see: Maestas et al. 2006), the bulk of the literature examining 
candidate entry in Congressional elections has focused on the P component of Black’s 
model (i.e., Lazarus 2008; Jacobson and Kernell 1981). Particularly for those 
pondering a run against an incumbent, the probability of winning often seems 
exceedingly small, since re-election rates in the U.S. House usually exceed 90%, and 
similar rates are apparent in state legislative elections as well (Jacobson 2009, 28; 
Niemi et al. 2006).  
 
Campaign costs have received comparatively little attention in the discussion of the 
entry calculus, despite the fact that in recent decades, overall expenditure levels have 
grown markedly in both federal elections and in many states (e.g., Gross & Goidel, 
2003, pg. 35; Lott, 2000; Malbin & Gais, 1998, pg. 15; Moncrief 1998). As races 
become more expensive on average, candidates must pay higher costs in both money 
and time. For instance, Steen (2006, 11) found that the average “potentially 
competitive” non-incumbent Congressional candidate in the 1992-2000 elections spent 
over $180,000 of her own money. Even with substantial contributions from their 
personal wealth, most candidates must also assemble sophisticated funding operations 
and devote considerable effort to “dialing for dollars” if they hope to remain 
financially competitive. Herrnson (2004) has described the tension between funding 
and other aspects of campaigning as spawning two separate campaigns: one for 
money, and the other for votes.  
 
The monetary costs of running for state legislative office do not approach those of 
running for Congress, but they are still a substantial hurdle for most potential 
candidates. For instance, the average cost of a 2008 campaign for California 
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Assembly--the most professionalized of all state houses--was about $360,000.35 In 
Arizona and Connecticut, which the National Conference of State Legislatures 36 
categorizes as “semi-professional,” average costs for lower house campaigns were 
about $41,000 and $18,500, respectively. In Maine, categorized as a “part-time” 
assembly, the figure was slightly less than $5,000. Even this sum is more than many 
citizens could comfortably spend on a long-shot race, and stringent state contribution 
limits can lead to considerable fundraising time costs since more donors must be 
contacted to raise necessary funds.37 
 
In short, should they decide to run, candidates must either spend their own money or 
devote crucial time to raising it from donors. Within this framework, the campaign 
cost in Black's equation can can be disaggregated into three distinct components: The 
candidate's anticipated personal financial cost (F), the time and emotional cost of 
raising funds(M), and the time and emotional costs associated with conducting the 
remainder of the campaign, or by Herrnson's description, the one for votes (V). Black's 
model can therefore be rewritten as Model 1, which reflects an expanded campaign 
utility calculus pertaining to candidates in traditional, privately financed 
environments: 
 
(1)   u(O)=(PB)-(F+M+V) 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 National Institute on Money in State Politics: http://www.followthemoney.org 
36 http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=16701#side_by_side 
37 For instance, the per-cycle individual contribution limit to any single legislative candidate in 
Connecticut and Maine was $250 in 2008. In Arizona, it was $400. 
 63 
Public election financing of the sort in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine is designed to 
function primarily on the F and M variables in this model.38 Francia and Herrnson 
(2003) confirmed that the receipt of full subsidies effectively eliminates fundraising 
from the list of necessary campaign tasks. Since the subsidy provides all campaign 
money, candidates do not contribute their own funds during the general election, and 
so the values of both the F and M terms in Model 2 become zero when the candidate 
accepts full funding. Following these assumptions, the utility of running a race with 
full funding (u(Op)) is expressed in Equation 2: 
 
(2)   (u(Op)) = (PB)-(V) 
 
Since the sum of F and M in Equation 1 for almost all candidates is greater than 0, 
then the relationship between the utility of running with full subsidies and that of 
running a traditionally financed campaign is:  
 
[(u(Op)) = (PB)-(V)] > [u(O)=(PB)-(F+M+V)] 
 
This inequality is consistent with the argument: that full funding eliminates personal 
monetary and fundraising time costs. Yet, if the utility of a fully funded campaign is 
always greater than a traditionally funded campaign, then all candidates should be 
expected to participate. However, in 2008 about one quarter of the candidates in Clean 
Elections states declined public subsidies. A model that seeks to explain fully the 
utility of public election funding should account abstainers. In the following section I 
therefore turn to another factor that alters the cost calculus for challengers: ideology. 
                                                 
38 Public money likely increases potential candidates’ perception of their electoral chances in fully 
funded states, since in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, financial parity is promised to all who opt in 
(but see Chapter 5). 
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Public Funding and Partisan Costs 
 
There are a number of potential explanations for candidates' decisions to opt out of 
public funding programs. For unopposed incumbents, the paperwork associated with 
obtaining subsidies might be difficult to justify. In other cases, particularly in the first 
elections after implementation of public funding, the benefits of participation may not 
be clear. In subsequent election cycles, inexperienced challengers may intend to 
participate but fail to qualify for public subsidies. Others may simply conclude that 
their situation dictates that unless they raise much more than the spending limit, they 
cannot win.39 Given these issues, it is unlikely that any public funding program will 
draw universal participation, but there is also no clear reason to believe that any group 
is disadvantaged. 
 
That said, there is some evidence in the literature of disproportionate partisan 
participation in public funding, which may suggest an underlying ideological 
component to the participation decision. For instance, in their analysis of gender and 
public funding participation, Werner and Mayer (2007) found partisan effects, with 
Democrats more likely to participate overall. Moreover, Clean Elections in 
Connecticut seems to serve as a greater incentive for more liberal citizens to enter 
politics than it does for conservatives (La Raja 2008).40 In tandem, these studies 
suggest that personal ideology is one determinant of public funding acceptance. 
                                                 
39 Considering the matching funds provisions of the fully funded states, only a small number of 
challengers should be expected to abstain from public funding for financial reasons. In all fully funded 
states, participating candidates are provided with additional subsidies if their privately funded 
opponents raise more than the spending limit; Clean Elections programs in Maine and Arizona 
guarantee financial parity for participating candidates if their opponents spend up to double or triple the 
original subsidy amount, respectively. Challengers who would opt out in order to avoid spending limits 
and build a financial advantage would therefore need the capacity to raise uncommonly large sums. 
40 Respondents in La Raja's analysis self-identified as liberal or conservative on a 7 point scale. 
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I argue that the personal orientation toward the proper fiscal role of government of 
some candidates is in fact the most crucial factor in their decision to accept public 
funding. Specifically, should they decide to participate in public funding programs, 
fiscal conservatives must reconcile the acceptance of government funds with an 
ideology that generally places a high value both on the free market and on diminished 
government spending.41 As one Arizona Republican candidate described his rationale 
for opposing Clean Elections: “It removes the market forces that exist economically in 
a campaign. And I believe strongly in market forces, whether it’s in the economy, in 
education, (or) in politics.”  
 
Moreover, even if conservative candidates are able to justify public funding as a 
means to an end in their own conscience, they may still believe that participation 
makes them appear hypocritical to the electorate at large, even though the general 
public cares little about campaign finance law (see: Primo 2002).42 For example, 
another Arizona Republican described a primary campaign strategy designed to 
capitalize on the fact that he ran with private money while his Republican opponents 
accepted subsidies: “I personally took out the piece of mail against the two other 
candidates criticizing them for running with taxpayer funds. I think it was very 
effective. It was sent to Republican households, and for most Republicans, I think it 
strikes a chord for them.” In other words, candidates running in very conservative 
districts may fear an electoral backlash, diminishing the probability of a successful 
campaign.  
                                                 
41 Fiscal conservativism is not a dichotomous condition; rather I argue that it exists in degrees from an 
ideology that merely favors loose business regulation and low taxes to a pure libertarianism that would 
call for an end to all government intervention in private business. 
42 Even in New Jersey, which has been running Clean Elections pilots in some districts since 2005, 
approximately 80% of residents in districts where candidates may receive public funding consistently 
report no knowledge of the program, despite a focused public policy experiment that garnered 
substantial news coverage (Woolley and Vercellotti 2007). 
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With this in mind, Equation 2 in the previous section requires modification to allow 
different costs for more conservative candidates. For these candidates, running a 
publicly funded campaign reduces the time and monetary costs of funding, but it also 
adds emotional and/or political costs as candidates must justify participating in a 
program that they find to be politically unsavory. Moreover, acceptance of subsidies 
requires some discount of the candidate's perceived win probability. The addition of 
an ideological cost term I in Model 3 therefore facilitates a final utility model for a 
candidate who would run with full funding. The I term is approximately zero for 
liberal candidates and grows larger as candidates become more conservative: 
 
(3)   (u(Op)) = (PB)-(V+I) 
 
In short, as a candidate's fiscal ideology moves from a moderate, low tax and 
regulation position to a libertarian one that supports almost no entanglement between 
the public and private realms, the more likely that she perceives an additional cost of 
accepting public funding. Candidates in fully funded environments must compare the 
utility derived from Equation 1, or running with traditional funding sources, and 
Equation 3, which reflects the utility of running a fully funded campaign. I assume 
that candidates perceive the benefits of office as the same regardless of whether they 
accept full funding, and that they are knowledgeable of and eligible for public funding. 
In this scenario rational candidates would accept full funding when the ideological 
costs accompanying participation are less than the costs that would be accrued raising 
money from private sources, or: 
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(F+M )> (I)  
 
Since I is higher for more conservative candidates, and assuming that Republicans (R) 
are more conservative than Democrats (D) on average, then Democrats should be 
more likely to accept Clean Elections subsidies. In the context of an incumbent-
challenged election, the probability of an incumbent facing a publicly funded 
challenger (P(Cp)) should be conditional on the incumbent's partisan affiliation, 
suggesting the following hypothesis: 
 
H(2.1):  [ (P(Cp)) │ R] > (P(Cp)) │ D] 
 
Republican incumbents are more likely than incumbents from other parties to face a 
publicly funded major-party challenger. 
 
Public funding is intended to alter the electoral environment. If it is strengthening 
subsidized challengers while imparting higher participation costs on one party because 
it is more likely to be populated by conservative candidates, then the overall 
relationship between Clean Elections and electoral competition should be re-
examined. In the following sections, I evaluate the hypothesis above, and discuss how 
it affects the link between full funding and heightened competition. 
 
Party and Publicly Funded Challenges 
For the remainder of this chapter, I examine survey data from respondents in Arizona, 
Connecticut, and Maine. I also seek evidence from election data. For each state, I 
collected data from all incumbent-contested state legislative elections for which public 
funding was available, as well as for three election cycles previous to its 
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implementation.43 I retrieved historical election data from the offices of the Secretaries 
of State in each state and data on challenger funding status from the appropriate state 
campaign finance regulatory agencies. I obtained summary financial information on 
Maine and Arizona candidates from 1994 to 2006 from the Wisconsin Campaign 
Finance Project,44 Connecticut and Maine candidates for 2008 from the state campaign 
finance disclosure agencies, and 2008 Arizona as well as 2002-2006 Connecticut 
candidates from the National Institute on Money in State Politics.45 
 
To test the hypothesis that Republican incumbents in fully funded systems are more 
likely than their Democratic counterparts to face a publicly funded challenger, I first 
examine survey responses and historical election data. I then construct separate 
logistic regression models for each fully funded state. Reelection-seeking incumbents 
for the lower legislative house in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine serve as the unit of 
analysis. The dependent variable for the models in Connecticut and Maine is a 
dichotomous indicator of whether the incumbent was challenged by a major-party 
opponent who accepted full public election subsidies.46 I anticipate that Democratic 
challengers are more likely to accept public funding; the independent variable of 
interest is therefore a dichotomous indicator of whether the incumbent was a 
Republican. I expect the model to return a significant positive coefficient on this 
variable, reflecting higher odds of a publicly funded challenge for Republican 
incumbents. 
 
                                                 
43 2008 is the only election for which public funding has been available to candidates in Connecticut, 
and I collected data from 2002-2008 elections in that state. For Arizona and Maine, I collected data 
from 1994-2008. 
44 http://campfin.polisci.wisc.edu/ 
45 http://www.followthemoney.org 
46 I consider the Green Independent Party of Maine a major party. Within the theoretical expectations of 
this chapter, I hereafter group them with Democrats. 
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That said, there are other factors that might also influence the dependent variable. For 
instance, challengers are likely to use the incumbents’ most recent electoral 
performance as a shortcut measure of his or her political support in the district, and 
incumbents who faced close elections in previous years may be viewed as vulnerable. 
Moreover, it is possible that incumbents who are defending a seat for the first time 
might be seen as weaker, since they have had less time to gain name recognition and 
otherwise consolidate the advantages of incumbency. Both of these factors are likely 
to encourage the emergence of a challenge, which itself should raise the probability of 
facing a publicly funded challenger. To account for these possibilities, I include as 
covariates the incumbent’s two-party general election victory margin in the previous 
election as well as a dummy variable coded 1 for the first time an incumbent defended 
his or her seat and 0 for all re-election campaigns thereafter.47  
 
Arizona requires a modified approach. State house elections in that state are conducted 
in multi-member districts in which the top two vote recipients from each district are 
elected. Since they may find themselves running in the same district as another 
incumbent who may or may not be a member of the same party, Arizona incumbents 
face a wider range of potential strategic circumstances. To account for the differences 
associated with Arizona's multimember districts, the dependent variable for the 
Arizona model is a dichotomous measure of whether the incumbent was challenged by 
at least one publicly-funded, non-incumbent member of the opposite party. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 I also include dummy variables for each election cycle. 
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Findings 
Analysis of survey and election statistics support the notion of ideological effects in 
the decision to accept public funding. Figure 1 contains the proportions of traditionally 
financed survey respondents from the 2008 election who reported opting out of public 
money for strategic and ideological reasons.48 The percentages reported in Figure 2 
show that ideology is the most frequently cited reason for candidates to opt out of 
public funding programs. About 10% of respondents believed that the subsidy would 
provide insufficient funds to wage a competitive race, and opted out in order to raise 
more than was allowed by statutory spending limits. Approximately the same 
proportion believed that raising a large sum from private sources early in the race 
would deter challengers from entering, and opted out of public funding in order to do 
so.49 As the theory would predict, ideology is the major factor in the decision to opt 
out of subsidies: Over 60% of traditionally financed candidates cited ideology as their 
reason for declining public funding.  
 
 
Figure 2: Reasons for Opting Out of Public Funding Cited by Survey 
Respondents* 
                                                 
48 Candidates were able to choose any or all of the options in the survey. 
49 The majority of candidates who marked the “other” category cited a lack of opposition or an 
unwillingness to submit to relatively onerous Clean Elections reporting requirements. 
 Assuming that Republicans are more fiscally conservative on average than Democrats, 
then analysis of descriptive statistics derived from election data lends further support 
to the idea of an ideologically
depicts the percentage of Republican and Democratic general election state house 
candidates who accepted public funding in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine from 
2000 to 2008. In both Arizona and Maine, where comparison over time is possible, a
similar trend is apparent: While participation levels for both parties are generally 
higher in 2008 than 2000, in every election, a higher proportion of Democrats than 
Republicans chose to run with public funding. This is true even in 2004, when 
Republican participation peaked in both states before leveling off in Maine and falling 
somewhat in Arizona. In the 2008 Connecticut election, the difference between 
Democratic and Republican participation was approximately six percentage points. To 
sum, in all 11 election cycles depicted in Figure 3, more Democrats than Republicans 
chose to run with public funding. As noted above, an unfamiliarity with the programs 
likely explains lower overall participation rates early in their histories, yet the 
enduring partisan gap is consistent with a cost differential that makes participation 
more difficult for some Republican candidates. 
Figure 3: Percentage of Democratic and Republican General Election State 
House Candidates Who Accepted Public Funding
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If more fiscally conservative candidates are more likely to conclude that public 
funding carries unbearable political costs, then it is reasonable to expect that 
Democratic incumbents will be less likely to face a publicly funded challenger. Figure 
4 shows the percentage of incumbents in each state who were challenged by major 
party opponents and by publicly funded opponents during years for which public 
funding was available. In Connecticut, Republican and Democratic incumbents were 
challenged at about the same rate in 2008; just under 60% of incumbents of both 
parties faced major-party competition. However, while slightly more than 30% of 
Democrats faced a publicly funded opponent, nearly half of Republicans did. A 
similar trend is apparent in Arizona, where incumbents of both parties were challenged 
by at least one candidate of the opposite party about 70% of the time, but the 
percentage of Democrats and Republicans facing at least one publicly funded 
challenger was about 42% and 62%, respectively. A somewhat weaker association 
between party and Clean Elections participation is evident in Maine, where since 2000 
Republicans have been much more likely than Democrats to face a major party 
challenge. In contrast to Arizona and Connecticut however, the gap between 
Democratic and Republican challengers who opted out of public funding is relatively 
small once the differences in the likelihood of a challenge are accounted for. Still, the 
difference is about two percentage points in the expected direction, and at very least, 
Figure 4 provides little reason to doubt the theoretical framework above. 
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Figure 4: Incumbents Challenged, and Challenged by Publicly Funded 
Opponents 
 
Yet Figure 4 does not allow for conclusive inference. To this end, I now turn to the 
results of the logistic regression models for Arizona, Connecticut and Maine, which 
are contained in Table 4.1. To account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity 
between legislative districts, I report standard errors clustered by district.50 While 
clustering does not change standard errors for the Connecticut or Maine models, it 
does result in a larger standard error on the Republican dummy variable in Arizona. 
As such, I report clustered standard errors because they yield the most cautious 
approach to inference. 
 
I first consider the model control variables. In Arizona and Connecticut, the 
incumbent's victory margin in the previous election is a negative and significant 
predictor of the probability of a publicly funded challenger emerging. A strong 
incumbent is probably less likely to face a challenger at all, and is therefore less likely 
to face one who accepts public funding. In Maine, previous margin is not associated 
with the probability of facing a publicly funded challenger; “marginal” incumbents are 
equally likely to face a Clean Elections candidate as those who won by wide margins. 
Likewise, the dummy variable for a candidate's first defense of her seat is not a 
                                                 
50 Clusters in Arizona and Maine account for redistricting that occurred in 2002 and 2004, respectively. 
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significant predictor of publicly funded challenge in any state. 
 
Table 4.1: Logistic Regression Coefficients and Robust Standard Errors:  
Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine Incumbents Challenged by Publicly Funded 
Opponents 
 
 Arizona Connecticut Maine 
    
Dummy: Incumbent is Republican .910* 1.43* .792* 
 (.437) (.519) (.214) 
Dummy: Incumbent's First 
Defense of Seat 
 
.239 
 
-.134 
 
-.033 
 (.331) (.606) (.212) 
Victory Margin Over Top Major 
Party Opponent in Last Election 
 
-.015* 
 
-.021* 
 
-.002 
 (.006) (.007) (.004) 
Dummy: Same Party Incumbent 
Running 
 
-.687 
 
- 
 
- 
 (.50)   
 
Constant 
 
-.048 
 
.446 
 
-1.62* 
 (.694) (.417) (.320) 
    
N 187 130 505 
McFadden's R2 .16 .11 .17 
Log Likelihood -107.97 -77.88 -281.26 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-Squared 3.47 11.84 4.54 
*p<.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by legislative district. I fix effects by election 
cycle. Re-election-seeking incumbents are the unit of analysis. The dependent variable in Connecticut 
and Maine is a dichotomous indicator of whether the incumbent was challenged by an opponent who 
accepted public funding. In Arizona, it is a dichotomous indicator of whether the incumbent was 
challenged by at least one opponent who accepted public funding. 
 
In all three states, the coefficient for the Republican dummy variable is both positive 
and highly significant, indicating that Republicans are more likely than their 
Democratic counterparts to face a publicly funded challenge.51 Figure 5 depicts the 
predicted probabilities, derived from the models, of a publicly funded challenger 
                                                 
51 Bivariate logistic regressions of a publicly funded challenge on partisan affiliation also result in 
positive, significant coefficients from data in all three states. 
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emerging against Republican and Democratic incumbents. I depict the probabilities 
over a range of victory margins in the last election from 0 (very close) to 100 
(unopposed) to demonstrate how the incumbents' previous success influences the 
probability of a publicly funded challenge, holding all other model variables at their 
means.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of Democratic and Republican Incumbents 
Facing a Publicly Funded Challenger 
 
As should be expected given the significance of the coefficient for previous victory 
margin in Arizona and Connecticut, the probabilities of publicly funded challenge 
decrease in those states as the incumbent's prior victory margin increases, and in 
Maine, the probability remains fairly constant regardless of previous win margin. The 
distance between Republican and Democratic incumbents is about the same across the 
total range of prior victory margins in all three states. In both Arizona and Maine, for 
any given value of an incumbent's previous strength, the difference in the probability 
of facing a publicly funded challenge between Republican and Democratic incumbents 
is about 20 points. In Connecticut, the difference is about 20 points at the low and high 
points of the range, and about 40 points at a previous margin of .50. 
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Implications: Public Funding and Competition 
 
In tandem with the survey responses and other data, the results of the logistic 
regression models in the previous section confirm the predictions of the utility model: 
Republican incumbents are more likely to face a publicly funded challenge. One key 
question emerges from this finding: Does it matter? If publicly funded challengers 
perform better against incumbents than their traditionally financed counterparts, then 
partisan differences in participation may lead to benefits that accumulate 
disproportionately to Democrats. One such benefit might be that Republican 
incumbents are more likely to face a strong challenge. In this section, I therefore 
briefly examine the relationship between Clean Elections and electoral competition, 
using data not only from the state legislative races analyzed in the previous section, 
but also from three election cycles prior to the implementation of public funding. My 
aim is not to advance a broad argument about competition, but rather to suggest that 
the ideological costs of participation may have important practical effects. 
 
The matching funds provisions of the Clean Elections programs are intended not only 
to alleviate the financial gap between challengers and incumbents, but to eliminate it 
altogether in most cases. Figure 6 depicts the incumbent's mean share of money in 
contested lower house Arizona, Connecticut and Maine elections when the challenger 
participates in and opts out of public funding. The pattern apparent in Figure 6 
indicates that the programs have achieved the goal of “evening the financial playing 
field” for challengers who accept full subsidies. When they run against privately 
funded opponents, incumbents in the three states control between 70% and 80% of the 
money in a given contest. However, when they are challenged by a candidate who 
accepts public funding, incumbents raise almost exactly half of the funds in their race.  
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Figure 6: Percentage of Money Raised by Incumbent When Challenged by 
Traditional And Publicly Funded Challenger 
 
Increased financial parity should lead to heightened competition, since a number of 
studies have found that an inability to raise funds all but eliminates a challenger from 
contention (e.g. Herrnson, 2004, pg. 248; Malbin & Gais, 1998, pg. 145; Cassie and 
Breaux, 1998; Gierzynski and Breaux, 1993; 1991; Jacobson 1980). Jacobson (1990) 
argues that improving challengers' relative financial position is likely to be an 
effective mechanism to increase competition. In eliminating systemic financial gaps 
between challengers and incumbents, Clean Elections therefore holds the promise to 
improve competition levels that have been waning for decades in state elections (e.g., 
Niemi et al. 2006; Goidel and Shields 1994; Garand 1991; Weber, Tucker, and Brace 
1991; Jewell and Breaux 1988).  
 
Indeed, at least three previous studies have found some link between full funding and 
competition. In a 2003 report, the Government Accountability Office found evidence 
of a higher number of competitive incumbent-challenged races in the 2000 and 2002 
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legislative elections in Arizona and Maine.52 Mayer, Werner, and Williams (2006) 
show that the findings in the GAO study were likely understated. Re-examining the 
findings of that study while adding data from 2004, Mayer, Werner, and Williams 
conclude that “there is compelling evidence that Arizona and Maine have become 
much more competitive states” with the implementation of Clean Elections. Finally, 
Malhotra (2008) examines two measures of competitiveness in Arizona and Maine 
Senate elections, concluding that while competition levels overall are not much 
different when public funding is available, the presence of a publicly funded 
challenger diminishes incumbent margins. In other words, public funding heightens 
competition when a challenger chooses to accept it. Following these studies, I next 
examine the electoral performance of fully funded candidates compared to their 
traditionally funded counterparts.  
 
Competition: Results from Genetic Matching Exercise 
As noted above, previous efforts to uncover the relationship between full funding and 
electoral competition have relied on compilation of summary and/or population 
statistics (i.e., Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006; GAO 2003) or the results of OLS 
regression models with legislative districts serving as the unit of analysis (Malhotra 
2008). These studies have yielded promising results for those who seek more 
competitive elections in publicly funded environments. However, this chapter shows 
that such methods do not allow definitive causal conclusions since candidates' 
decisions to participate in public funding are not random (see: Sekhon 2009).  
I overcome this issue by examining differences in the two party general election vote 
received by candidates included in the matching exercise described in Chapter 2. The 
rationale for this method, as well as the specifics of the matching algorithm, are 
                                                 
52 The GAO defines a “competitive” race as one with an incumbent margin of less than 15 points. 
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described at length in that chapter. If Clean Elections is an effective means of 
enhancing competition, then genetic matching should return a significant, positive 
treatment effect, indicating that candidates who accept full subsidies receive 
significantly higher percentages of the two party general election vote. 
 
The treatment effect derived from the matching exercise is contained in Table 4.2. The 
results are consistent with previous examination of competition in fully funded states. 
With a mean of 3.35 and a standard error or 1.34, the match demonstrates a significant 
treatment effect of accepting full subsidies. Specifically, candidates who take full 
funding perform better in the general election, and can expect an increased share of the 
2-party vote of over 3 percentage points. A Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis 
like that in Chapter 2 shows that the p-value associated with the treatment effect 
remains significant at α= .05 until Γ= 1.35; In other words, the inference is valid until 
the odds of a candidate accepting public money are 1.35 times higher because of a 
difference in unobservable characteristics between public and traditional groups (see: 
Rosenbaum 2002; Keele 2009). Notably, the finding with regard to the effect of full 
funding on electoral competition is less robust to unobserved bias than the effect on 
candidate time reported in Chapter 2. However, matching does result in a significant 
treatment effect, and the balance statistics reported in Chapter 2 lend higher 
confidence in the validity of the reported causal relationship between public funding 
and competition than an OLS model would. 
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  Table 4.2: Genetic Matching Results: Average 
Treatment Effects on the Treated Groups, 
Candidate Share of 2 Party Vote 
 
Acceptance of 
Full Funding 
Treated Observations 169 
Average Effect 3.35* 
Standard Error (1.34) 
Treatment effects expressed as a percentage of 2-party 
general election vote. 
* Statistically Significant, p<.05 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter makes two contributions to the political science literature examining 
public election funding. First, I demonstrate that Republican incumbents are more 
likely to meet a major party challenger who accepts full public subsidies in all three 
states. Second, consistent with previous examinations of the effect of Clean Elections 
on electoral competition, I show that candidates who accept full funding perform 
better than those who do not.  
 
For advocates who see Clean Elections as even-handed reform that creates a fair 
playing field for all candidates, these findings should be troubling. The reform rhetoric 
stresses the program's ability to generate equity in the electoral process, closing the 
financial gap between incumbents and challengers, which in turn leads to more 
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competitive elections. Yet, participation in public funding programs imparts higher 
costs on conservative candidates than it does for moderate and liberal ones. 
Particularly given that equality is one of the cornerstones of Clean Elections, it is 
worthwhile to consider whether the practical effects of full subsidies may also be 
uneven. It is difficult to demonstrate conclusively that Republican incumbents are 
systematically disadvantaged in fully funded systems. However, since candidates who 
accept public funding perform better, and since Republicans are about 20 points more 
likely to meet such a challenge, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that public 
funding affects the electoral fortunes of Democratic incumbents less on average.  
 
Public funding imparts disproportionate political costs on some candidates but not 
others. Future research should continue to account for partisan differences in candidate 
participation, extending this analysis to upper-chamber elections where candidate 
quality is more readily observable. Moreover, political scientists should expand the 
definition of “competition” beyond incumbent margins. For instance, fully funded 
challengers may simply lose by a narrower margin, or perhaps they have a higher 
probability of winning. If the latter case is true, then Clean Elections may be adding 
Democratic seats to the legislative chambers, with obvious implications for public 
policy
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GAMING ARIZONA: MATCHING FUNDS AND TRADITIONALLY FINANCED 
CANDIDATE BEHAVIOR 
 
“Clean Elections chills my speech.” 
 
-Traditionally Financed Arizona Candidate 
 
In previous chapters I have shown that public election funding changes American 
elections. Intuitively, most of those changes bear on candidates who participate in 
public funding. However, by changing the market forces at work in most traditionally 
funded elections, public money also threatens to spawn unforeseen consequences even 
for candidates who opt out. In this chapter, I focus on the manner in which the 
matching funds provisions of Arizona’s Clean Elections program have changed the 
strategic calculus for all candidates in the system, not just those who accept public 
funding. The altered patterns of spending and voter engagement were unforeseen by 
reformers in Arizona, but if public funding is to be meaningfully evaluated, all effects 
must be considered.  
 
Like those in Connecticut and Maine, Arizona’s matching funds allocations are grants 
given to participating candidates when they are outraised or outspent; the extra 
subsidies mandate financial parity even when some candidates choose not to 
participate in the program. In primary elections, matching funds are triggered when 
money is spent. In general elections, participating candidates are matched when either 
their opponent raises money or an independent expenditure is made. In either instance, 
expenditures beyond the publicly financed candidate’s subsidy amount are matched 
dollar for dollar to an aggregate limit of three times the original allocation.  
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From the perspective of a non-participating candidate, once the original subsidy 
threshold is breached, a dollar spent is in effect a dollar contributed to the other side. 
The importance of matching funds is perhaps best understood by an example of 
publicly funded candidates in partially and fully funded states running against an 
opponent who raises and spends $75,000 (Table 5.1). In a system of partial funding, in 
which a candidate receives a subsidy equivalent to 45% of the spending limit (as is the 
case in Wisconsin), a publicly funded candidate would still be facing a spending 
deficit of nearly $64,000.  
 
Table 5.1: Public Funding Scenarios 
 
Opponent Spending Subsidy Matching Funding 
Spending Limit Amount Funds Gap 
Clean 
Elections $75,000 $25,000  $25,000  $50,000  $0  
 
Partial 
Funding $75,000 $25,000  $11,250  - $63,750  
 
In Arizona’s Clean Elections system, however, opponent’s expenditures would trigger 
matching funds allocations, preserving funding equality. The elimination of the 
funding gap is the keystone of Clean Elections’ promise; participating candidates can 
be outspent in only the most exceptional cases. Given its status as the most generous 
system of public election finance and matching contributions, Arizona is therefore an 
ideal location to search for unintended consequences. If matching funds cause a 
different sort of campaign, then it is reasonable to expect that a detectable effect.53 
                                                 
53 Arizona matches up to three times the original subsidy amount, its legislative elections are much 
more expensive than Maine's, and its longer history of public funding (compared to Connecticut) allow 
time for traditionally financed candidates to learn, and to adapt their behavior accordingly. 
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In this chapter, I present the results of candidate interviews shortly after the 2006 
Arizona legislative election. I supplement the interviews with data on matching funds 
distributions from the Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission, Arizona’s public 
funding regulatory agency. In short, I find that the generous matching funds provision 
leads to altered campaign strategy and spending patterns of Arizona’s privately 
financed candidates. Nonparticipating candidates are using matching funds to achieve 
maximum financial advantage, shifting traditional conceptions of campaign strategy as 
they modify their spending patterns to minimize the impact of “clean” money. The 
resulting environment may undermine the spirit of the law itself. While Clean 
Elections may well have achieved some of its stated objectives, for better or worse, the 
law has fundamentally changed campaign strategy in the Grand Canyon State. 
 
Shifting Strategies 
Nonparticipating (traditional) candidates must pay careful attention to expenditure 
levels so as not to benefit a publicly funded opponent. One traditional candidate 
described a campaign that was “very calculating in how much we sent out to keep 
spending as low as possible” in an effort to mitigate this effect. Another traditionally 
funded incumbent reached the same conclusion, saying, “If I raised $100,000 and he 
capped out at $69,000 that would give me a $30,000 advantage. I don’t know that I 
could raise that much, so I think we would probably be equal. I would spend a lot of 
time and money raising that money . . . just (to) give it to him.” Still another 
incumbent clearly articulated the degree to which matching funds call for careful 
attention to spending: 
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I don’t want to raise money and give my opponent money. If I can keep the spending 
down, me as an incumbent, I have a tremendous advantage . . . If I am a traditional 
candidate, and I raise $50,000, he’s going to get that money, and he’s going to use it to 
get more voters out. So I’m getting advice from both camps now. I’m getting advice 
that says “you need to raise $100,000, because you need to get your message out, you 
need to get your voters out,” and I hear the other people are saying “you need to go 
clean, because you don’t need to be raising money for him, and in a low spending 
race, it’s you as an incumbent that has the advantage.” 
 
The desire for cost efficiency is present in all campaigns, but the effects of matching 
funds shift the spending calculus well beyond simple husbandry. While all traditional 
candidates interviewed expressed concern about the effect of matching funds on their 
opponents, some described conscious decisions to withhold expenditures for items that 
may have increased their performance at the polls:  
 
Every dollar I spend over the threshold starts feeding the alligator trying to eat me. So 
I have to be very careful with how I spend money, which meant that I sent out a lot 
less mail and held a lot less events than I would have but for my hands feeling like 
they were tied under this system. That really irritated me, because I’d say “I’d love to 
rent a big tent, and we’ll have an old-fashioned ice cream sundae thing in the park” or 
whatever, but I didn’t want to do it unless everything was absolutely essential so that 
we didn’t trigger more money to our opponent. Quite honestly, I would have sent 
probably twice as much mail.  
 
Stories like this one were echoed by every candidate who had ever run traditionally 
against a Clean Elections opponent. One challenger who ran with public money 
observed that “those who want to go for the hundred thousand dollar campaign, 
they’re not so sure they want to do it because they don’t want to give me matching 
funds. I’m sure that they don’t want a level playing field.” Another challenger noticed 
that her traditionally financed opponent had stopped spending in order to avoid 
triggering matching funds: “He spent just the amount in the general election to avoid 
having to give me matching money.”  
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While traditional candidates ponder the advantage of not spending, those who accept 
public subsidies care little if their opponents spend large sums because they are 
protected by matching funds. When asked whether he would take issue with his 
opponent spending $75,000 against him, a first time challenger in a long-shot race 
said, “That would be O.K., because I like the matching funds clause. If my opponent 
wants to go raise traditional funds so I can get more money to spend for my campaign, 
I think I’m fine with it.” However, there is a great deal of anxiety among participating 
candidates regarding the timing of opponent expenditures. One newly elected 
legislator, fresh from a tough fight in the general election, echoed the sentiments of the 
others, but added an important clause (emphasis added):  
 
I think in some ways (my opponent) does think about (the effects of matching funds), 
and he limited his fundraising. I only got $2,500 in matching funds because of that. 
And he had a primary, and his one opponent was Clean Elections, and the other two 
were traditional, and the other two raised money like they were running a traditional 
campaign, not realizing that it impacted the Clean Elections candidate in huge ways. 
That Clean Elections candidate got huge amounts of money. But they wait until the 
last minute and spend it, to avoid that.  
 
The belief in the existence of strategic expenditure timing is ubiquitous. According to 
every informant I interviewed, traditionally funded candidates try to maximize the 
competitive effect of the money that they do spend by releasing funds at the last 
moment, giving the Clean Elections candidate little time to react. Traditional 
candidates conceded that while the timing of expenditures was not an initial 
component of their strategy, by the end, it was crucial in maintaining control of the 
political message. So, while late spending “[was not] like a Manhattan plan or 
anything, [it] was part of our thinking . . . let’s spend as little as possible early on, so 
that we could control the debate.” By releasing a mailing on the Friday before the 
election, traditional candidates are aware that even if their opponent is matched on the 
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same day, it is prohibitively difficult to spend money over the final weekend in any 
meaningful fashion.  
 
One experienced candidate described how traditional candidates maximize their 
strategic advantage: “You want to have a strategy and a plan of using those funds so 
that the matching funds are least beneficial to your opponent. In most cases you would 
think that that’s at the last second, so they can’t counter it. I think there’s benefit to 
that. I think that’s wise.” An incumbent who funded her campaign traditionally said, 
“We . . . think about [spending at the last minute], frankly. At least I do. Sometimes 
we may have planned what we’re going to do, but we don’t initiate anything, because 
the minute we sign a contract or the minute we initiate anything, we have to report.” 
Other candidates detailed how one can “really . . . work the system” by “spend[ing] 
money at the last minute if you’re a traditional candidate . . . the clean candidate gets 
that money, that match, the day before the election.” An incumbent with multiple 
cycles of election experience described this phenomenon:  
 
In terms of opponents incurring expenditures right before the elections, you know, the 
Friday before, that’s happened both times that I’ve run. And so you pick up a check 
from the Clean Elections department, you know, that Friday night, for the matching 
money, good luck trying to spend $5,000. So that has definitely played into most 
campaigns now, you know, people know that if you are going to go over the 
expenditure limit, you do it that weekend before. 
 
Yet another legislator noted that campaign strategy has fundamentally changed as 
candidates play this game: 
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If a traditional candidate waits toward the end, and has some expenses that go over the 
limits, then the Clean Elections candidate gets matching funds, but if you do that 
farther down the road and the clean candidate doesn’t know about it, then she’s not 
going to have much time to plan how to spend that money, so there’s some strategic 
advantages that a traditional candidate has. It would not be an exaggeration to say that 
Clean Elections is shifting strategic considerations. 
 
Available data supports the existence of this trend. As Table 5.2 indicates, in no 
election since 2002 has the proportion of matching funds expenditures released in the 
last week of a cycle fallen below one-third of all such expenditures. Some of this 
activity is attributable to the natural flow of campaign spending, but if the traditionally 
financed candidates who trigger matching funds allocations are as conscious of the 
effects of their spending as they seem to be, a substantial portion of late spending is 
delayed to maximize its strategic effect. Further, matching funds allocations within 
one day of the election generally comprise a substantial percentage of overall “last-
minute” expenditures. In the 2006 general election, which the informants participated 
in, over 40% of expenditures occurring in the last week were released just hours 
before the polls opened. The majority of these matching funds allocations are no doubt 
resultant of strategic expenditure as traditional candidates and outside entities seek to 
gain favor with the electorate while leaving the publicly funded candidate little or no 
opportunity to respond. 
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Table 5.2: Timing of Matching Funds Allocations, 2002–2006 
Primary Election General Election 
Year 
Matching 
Funds 
Allocations 
 
Within 
One 
Week of 
Election 
 Within One 
Day of 
Election 
Matching 
Funds 
Allocations 
 Within One 
Week of 
Election 
Within 
One Day 
of 
Election 
2006 95 48 10 124 44 18 
(50.5%) (20.8%) (35.5%) (40.1%) 
2004 120 54 11 124 56 6 
(45.0%) (20.4%) (45.2%) (10.7%) 
2002 119 50 38 107 69 22 
(42.0%) 
 
(76.0%) (64.5%) (31.9%) 
 
 
Traditional candidates who purposely spend late have little sympathy for their publicly 
funded opponents, viewing a failure to adequately prepare for the expenditures on the 
final weekend as a lapse in proper planning. One legislator who had run as a 
traditional candidate described the importance of a prefabricated plan for publicly 
funded candidates to deal with late spending, saying, “I think I’m a good enough 
campaigner and strategist to figure that out.” Some Clean Elections candidates who 
actually faced this situation effectively anticipated late expenditures, and took steps to 
respond. One incumbent who had been the victim of last-minute attacks by 
traditionally funded candidates in the past behaved differently the next time, saying, “I 
got smarter the second time around . . . thinking that our opponent would probably 
spend, and (I) had a strategy ready to go on how we could spend that money quickly if 
we got matched.” Another experienced candidate said that when independent groups 
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spent money against her in the closing weeks, she was ready to respond by hiring a 
group of people willing and able to walk on her behalf: 
 
In my last race, every other day there was a hit piece. Every other day I would get 
matching funds. What do you do when you get $4,000 right before the election? If 
you’re smart, you have a strategy, and you think, “O.K. if I get $4,000 two weeks out, 
I’m doing this.” If I get it right before the election, I’m doing something else. I’d 
already pre-planned that I would hire union people who were out of work to work on 
Election Day for me, because it was something that represented my values, and was a 
financially prudent thing to do. 
 
The expectation of strategically timed spending was not limited to those with political 
experience. One first-time candidate in a crowded primary field had heard the stories 
of last-minute spending in other races, but had failed to assemble a formal response 
plan. However, the possibility of spending during the final weekend was present in the 
back of his mind, and he was able to mount an effective counterattack in the last 
moments of an ultimately unsuccessful campaign. In his case, it was an independent 
group, and not the opposition, that released funds with only days remaining before the 
election: 
 
I was attacked by a group . . . they put out a hit piece. I was able to use that 
immediately to get myself qualified for another $3,000 worth of money to send out my 
own extra last minute piece, which was a really good one actually . . . I barely had 
time to respond. I had run out of money, because that’s what happens. I really wanted 
to do another piece, but I just couldn’t budget for it. So I had a couple of ideas sitting 
on the back burner, and then it just happened.  
 
Many publicly funded candidates were not so savvy, and were caught unaware. 
Another first-time challenger described feelings of helplessness accompanying the 
realization that large amounts of money had been spent against him at the last minute, 
leaving him with matching funds but no time to spend them: 
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The last day, or the day before the election, they do all this stuff, and you don’t really 
have time to plan real well. I could do better if I did it a second time. As a matter of 
fact, I gave some money back, because I got five or six thousand dollars the last day. 
The traditional people, they do that so well. Some people said “you should do 
something” and I said I can’t use it effectively, and I’ll give it back. 
 
Another neophyte faced a similar situation, confronting feelings of disappointment 
with a system that was supposed to guarantee an even playing field. Outspent at the 
last minute, she was unable to respond, and faced the reality that despite her 
expectation of financial parity, she had been outflanked in the election’s closing hours: 
 
I believe [my opponent] spent a great deal of money in the time after the last reporting 
of expenses and income, so that I wouldn’t have to balance, so that they wouldn’t have 
to balance how much money I had with how much she had. You can’t plan; you can’t 
buy the media if you don’t know what they’re going to do. It would happen in a 
regular campaign anyway, but to be on the same playing field, we’re not, because 
clean elections candidates are guaranteed this amount of money and the others are not, 
but if they get to this amount or higher, we’ll raise the bar. And they can eventually 
outspend you. That’s not fair. 
 
Conclusion 
The allusion to fairness in the passage above is an important one. From the perspective 
of participating candidates, Arizona’s Clean Elections system was supposed to move 
away from politics as usual to something better, empowering challengers with 
adequate resources while mandating financial equality among all contenders. 
However, while the matching funds provision has successfully eliminated the financial 
gap between political haves and have-nots, an emotive gap remains. Traditional 
candidates view themselves as in control and on the offensive. They take a cool view 
of the shifting timing of campaign spending, describing strategic expenditures with 
such words as “smart,” “well-thought,” and “wise.” There is a universal recognition 
among them that when it comes to spending, later is almost always better.  
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Publicly funded candidates play defense, powerless to behave proactively and forced 
to guess when the opposition will make a move. Challengers in particular know that if 
they are to swing votes in their favor, they must be able to spend money. Withholding 
expenditures until the final days of an election cycle allows traditional candidates to 
effectively control the funding of their opponents, and given little time to respond, 
publicly funded candidates can be left holding the bag. These candidates, and 
particularly those running their first campaigns, report feelings of frustration and 
anxiety stemming from participation in a system that they believe falls short of its 
promised goal of “fairness.”  
 
Despite an emotional difference between the two groups, when traditional candidates 
directly face participating candidates, neither is fully in control. Once they near the 
spending limit, nonparticipating candidates subvert their expenditure instinct to the 
realities of matching funds, suppressing spending and/or fundraising so as to avoid the 
issuance of a check to their opponent. While they may have the resources to hold an 
ice cream social, the benefit must be weighed against the cost of bolstering the 
opposition. Participating candidates wring their hands in anticipation of strategically 
timed last minute expenditures, often unable to preempt such moves with activity of 
their own because, in the last stages of an election, they themselves have reached the 
spending limit. Indeed, when the ability of outside groups to trigger matching funds 
allocations is considered, it can be said that even candidates running in elections in 
which all participants are publicly financed experience a great deal of strategic 
uncertainty. 
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“Uncertain” also describes the future of matching funds in Arizona. In 2008, several 
candidates brought a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's 
matching funds provision on the basis that it creates disincentives to raise money and 
campaign for office. In McComish v. Brewer, a federal judge agreed, finding coercive 
elements bearing on non-participating candidates that could not be justified by 
Arizona's claim of compelling government interest. While the court refused to issue an 
injunction barring matching funds in the 2008 campaign, it appears that matching 
funds will not be available to candidates in 2010, as the United States Supreme Court 
temporarily enjoined the state from issuing matching funds while it considers whether 
to hear McComish. The effect, in the words of one legislator I re-interviewed in 2009, 
may be that “the lawsuit, by gutting the engine of the program, has effectively killed 
Clean Elections.” 
 
On that point, time will tell, but one thing is certain: Faced with shifting incentive 
structures, political costs, and opportunities, candidates in Arizona operate in a 
strategic environment that is fundamentally different from most of the rest of America. 
Public funding holds the potential to facilitate higher levels of financial equality 
among candidates, but while the money certainly helps, a subsidy alone is no panacea. 
In accepting financial assistance, candidates have given up control of their financial 
destiny and have acceded to conditions favoring both a flurry of last-minute 
campaigning and a depression in general campaign activity. These shifting strategies 
change not only the way in which candidates interact with each other, but also the 
manner in which they communicate with the electorate. Reformers have long asserted 
that publicly funded campaigns are better. In the near future, it appears that the courts 
will have to decide whether this assertion is valid. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation, I have examined public election funding in a new way, moving 
beyond contestedness and victory margins to an analysis of the manner in which 
election subsidies affect the behavior of candidates, including those who opt out of 
public funding. Moreover, I have shown that the effects of these changes extend to 
voting behavior. 
 
In Chapter 1, I briefly described the nature and scope of public election funding in the 
legislative elections of six American states. I showed that there is a substantive 
difference between programs that provide partial grants to candidates and Clean 
Elections statutes that fully subsidize legislative elections. I described my belief that 
the regulations of the latter group hold a greater potential to alter American 
campaigns, since they eliminate fundraising time obligations and their matching funds 
provisions guarantee financial parity among candidates in almost all situations.  
 
In Chapter 2, I examined the relationship between acceptance of public funding and 
the manner in which candidates use their time. Analyzing the survey data from 
candidates in eighteen states, I demonstrated with genetic matching methods that the 
acceptance of full public election subsidies provides candidates with time flexibility 
facilitating higher levels of direct interaction with citizens. The pattern is both highly 
significant and robust to unobservable bias; in the fully funded states candidates 
devote about 10 percentage points more of their weekly time to what I called “public 
interaction.” However, no such effect is present for candidates who accepted smaller, 
partial subsidies. I closed the chapter by speculating that such heightened interaction 
in fully funded elections may have implications for voting behavior in those states. 
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I tested this hypothesis in Chapter 3, in which I exploited a natural experiment to 
demonstrate that Maine and Connecticut voters are more likely to cast ballots for state 
legislative contests when candidates accept full funding. The results of two difference-
in-differences models showed that the presence of a publicly funded candidate 
diminishes ballot roll-off by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. This finding 
suggests that voters in these states are energized by a more visible election, whether by 
greater information or enhanced efficacy. In either case, I argue that higher voting 
propensity is a positive result. 
 
In Chapter 4, I confirmed the results of previous studies that have found a link 
between Clean Elections and enhanced competition, finding the acceptance of full 
funding increased legislative election vote share in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. 
However, I also developed a utility model showing that for candidates with a very 
conservative ideology, acceptance of full public funding imparts high personal costs 
that make a privately funded campaign a more attractive option. The model predicts 
that Republican incumbents should therefore be more likely to face a publicly funded 
challenger, which is confirmed with logistic regression models from data in each state. 
While these findings provide further evidence for more competitive elections in 
publicly funded systems, they also demonstrate that the likelihood of participation is 
mediated by partisan affiliation, suggesting that the practical effect of public funding 
may be uneven.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I analyzed qualitative interviews collected from candidates in 
Arizona. I found that full financing with matching funds holds a high potential to 
deliver unintended consequences in the form of altered behavior among traditionally 
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financed candidates, who report pervasive gaming as they exploited the provisions of 
public funding for strategic advantage. Specifically, mandated financial parity changes 
the calculations of such candidates, who withhold expenditures until the final days of 
an election, denying their publicly-funded opponents an opportunity to spend 
matching funds.  
 
For more than a quarter of a century the fundamental question with regard to public 
funding has been, “Can it make elections better? ” This dissertation does not provide 
an all-encompassing answer to that question; however, taken together, my findings 
demonstrate that full funding of the variety in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine 
dramatically alters strategic decision-making in political campaigns. From a normative 
perspective, some of these changes are certainly positive. For instance, it is difficult to 
forcefully argue that more interaction between candidates and voters is a bad thing. 
Furthermore, if some combination of increased information or enhanced political 
efficacy is driving a greater number of people to vote on more of the ballot, 
democracy and representation are likely improved when public funding is present.  
 
That said, I also show that public funding is certainly no panacea from the perspective 
of very conservative candidates, who would bear political costs of participation that do 
not exist for other candidates. Moreover, the shifting incentives that even traditionally 
financed candidates face under matching funds regulations lead to behavior with less-
than-clear consequences. While the electoral impact of partisan costs and matching 
funds strategy is unclear, I have shown that they yield an utterly altered political 
calculus for legislative candidates. 
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In other words, this dissertation shows that while publicly funded elections may or 
may not be “better” on balance, their conduct is indisputably different than 
traditionally financed American elections. Subsequent reforms should be evaluated not 
only in terms of easily measured concepts such as competition and candidate 
participation, but also in terms of the manner in which such reforms affect the 
behavior of political campaigns. Simply stated, rational actors conduct campaigns. If a 
program is intended to achieve certain outcomes, then it is useful to evaluate the 
means as well as the ends. Future programs should be considered with all available 
academic findings in this area, including those in this dissertation.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
I believe that there are at least three unexplored areas of full funding that lie outside of 
the scope of this project. First, while I address the question of whether acceptance of 
full funding imparts different utilities for different candidates, I leave unstudied the 
question of whether the existence of subsidies themselves serve as an inducement for 
candidate entry. My findings in Chapter 2 certainly suggest that public funding does 
not induce very conservative candidates to enter politics, but it is possible that 
moderate and liberal would-be candidates view public funding quite differently. La 
Raja (2008) has made some progress on this point, but some combination of a 
quantitative analysis of candidate counts and qualitative testimony from candidates 
themselves would go further to provide more insight into whether public funding 
actually draws citizens to public life. I suspect that overall, it does not. Money is, after 
all, but one of the costs of running, and public money should not provide a strong 
entry incentive for conservative candidates. Regardless, considering the overall 
participation gap between Democrats and Republicans that I demonstrate here, a 
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future analysis of full funding as an incentive for candidate entry absolutely must 
account for candidate ideology. 
 
Second, in Chapter 4 I found that the presence of a publicly funded candidate 
diminishes ballot roll-off in Connecticut and Maine. However, certain elements of the 
causal relationship remain unclear. Specifically, my analysis cannot determine 
whether diminished roll-off is due to a higher level of information that voters possess, 
or whether more personal meetings increase voter efficacy. In other words, voters may 
be more inclined to cast votes in down-ticket races because a candidate interaction 
raised their awareness of the candidates or issues in a given race. Alternatively, such 
an interaction may also lead the voter to believe that her vote matters more; since she 
met the politician, perhaps she is more likely to feel a personal connection that 
somehow results in better representation. Further research should go further to 
untangle the relationships between public interaction, political information, efficacy, 
and representation. 
 
Third, it is crucial to note that elections spawn governments. If public funding is 
altering elite behavior in the former, then it has almost certainly had effects on 
institutional behavior and policy outcomes in the latter. Such effects are likely to 
depend upon the political characteristics of each state. For instance, in Arizona, whose 
legislature has long been controlled by Republican majorities, the partisan effects 
described in Chapter 2 might be responsible for the narrower partisan gap in both 
chambers since 2000. At this writing, the Arizona Legislature is in the midst of 
national scrutiny stemming from several controversial and quite conservative acts on 
topics ranging from treatment of suspected illegal immigrants to ethnic studies 
programs in public education. The Legislature has passed these acts on near-
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universally partisan votes, and it is reasonable to wonder whether Democrats have 
made gains in moderate districts, leaving a Republican majority that is more 
conservative on balance. Of course, such effects could be resultant of favorable 
conditions for Democrats in the late 2000s, but further examination of party cohesion 
in the wake of Clean Elections is certainly worthwhile. 
 
Public Funding: Where it is Going and Why it Matters 
 
Two trends are clear in the future of public funding. First, the direct partial programs 
of the 1980s and 1990s, such as those functioning in Hawaii, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin, are not likely to expand elsewhere. Previous work has failed to find 
conclusive evidence of partial programs curbing spending growth or enhancing 
competition (i.e., Kraus 2006; Schultz 2002; Malbin & Gais 1998, 136; Mayer & 
Wood 1995; Jones and Borris 1985). Furthermore, as noted in previous chapters, 
partial programs do little to alter the campaign activities of candidates. While such 
programs may reduce somewhat the influence of business, labor, or issue advocacy 
organizations compared to individual contributors, these relationships have not been 
fully studied. Considering what is known, there is little reason for states or 
municipalities that might be inclined to implement public funding to seek partial 
programs. Perhaps predictably then, partial funding has become less prevalent among 
public funding schemes. No state has implemented such an arrangement since 
Minnesota, and to my knowledge New York City was the last major municipality to 
do so, in 1988. 
 
However, this is not to say that public funding has not been a popular reform tool. In 
fact, the second trend in public funding is that future programs will likely provide 
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direct subsidies to candidates at levels that approximate full campaign costs. As noted 
in the Introduction, since Arizona and Maine implemented their Clean Elections 
programs in 2000, a number of other states, including Connecticut, have followed for 
at least some elections. The most promising avenue for Clean Elections seems to be in 
judicial elections, where at least four states have created full funding programs and a 
number of others are discussing them. Similar trends are apparent in city elections; 
two major cities are running elections with full funding, and at least two others seem 
to strongly considering it as an option.  
 
That said, it is important to note that the trend toward full funding will only continue if 
the federal judiciary allows it to do so. As of April 2010, there are at least two major 
cases in federal courts that have the potential to effectively end Clean Elections in 
Arizona and Connecticut, and eventually in Maine as well. The first case, Green Party 
of Connecticut v. Garfield, challenges public funding in Connecticut. The suit was 
brought by the state's minor parties, including the Greens and Libertarians, who 
claimed that the program's provisions discriminate against them. Briefly, in addition to 
raising the qualifying contributions (which are the most stringent of any state 
operating under full funding), minor party candidates must have received 10, 15, or 20 
percent of the vote for the same office in the previous election. Clearing these hurdles 
allows them a CEP grant of one-third, two-thirds, or equal to major party candidates. 
Since qualification by vote threshold in these conditions is utterly impossible for 
minor party legislative candidates, they can also receive the same grant levels by 
collecting signatures equal to 10, 15, or 20 percent of the votes cast in that race in the 
previous election. 
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In an August 2009 decision, the U.S. District Court agreed with the petitioners, and 
enjoined the state of Connecticut from continuing its public funding program. Judge 
Stefan Underhill found that while Connecticut's program should be commended for its 
effort to promote transparency, "the CEP imposes an unconstitutional, discriminatory 
burden on minor party candidates’ First Amendment-protected right to political 
opportunity by enhancing participating major party candidates’ relative strength 
beyond their past ability to raise contributions and campaign, without imposing any 
countervailing disadvantage to participating in the public funding scheme." The judge 
wrote that garnering sufficient signatures is "a nearly impossible task" for minor party 
candidates given the level of organization required to accomplish it; since it therefore 
benefits major parties without extending the same benefits to minor ones, the judge 
was unable to allow the CEP to continue as written. Qualification for the programs in 
Maine and Arizona is blind to partisan affiliation, so it is more difficult to see how 
minor parties would have standing to bring suit on similar grounds. 
 
That said, the matching funds provisions in Arizona are also under legal assault 
elsewhere in the federal courts. As noted above, the Supreme Court has issued an 
injunction barring the state from issuing matching funds while it considers whether to 
hear McComish v. Brewer, which challenges matching funds on the basis that they 
adversely affect the speech of traditional candidates, as described in the final chapter 
of this dissertation. The 9th District Court was not persuaded on First Amendment 
grounds. However, since campaign spending was equated to speech in the logic of the 
Buckley decision, it is certainly possible that a program that provides incentives for 
political actors to withhold expenditures will be deigned to muzzle political speech, 
and if so it will be difficult for any state to justify this restriction. This is particularly 
true at the Supreme Court as currently comprised, given other recent decisions with 
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regard to campaign finance such as Citizens United v. FEC, which granted campaign 
speech rights to corporations as of 2010. 
 
In other words, while governments seem to recognize that full funding can pay some 
dividends, the future of public funding is unlikely to include matching funds 
provisions as they currently exist. Such a realization has led some advocacy groups to 
believe that well-funded hybrid plans may be the only way to inject substantial public 
funding into the system while passing constitutional scrutiny by the federal courts. 
Perhaps the most visible of these is the Fair Elections Now Act, which is as of May 
2010 a bill in United States Senate committee. If passed, the act would create a system 
of public funding for Congressional elections. Like candidates in Clean Elections 
states, those in the proposed system would qualify for public money by raising a 
predetermined number of small contributions. In House races, these contributions may 
not exceed $100 and candidates must surpass the $50,000 mark from a minimum of 
1,500 in-state contributors to be eligible for public funding. The formula for Senate 
qualification is more complicated, but essentially amounts to 2,000 contributors plus 
500 more for each congressional of the states congressional districts.  
 
Once they pass this threshold, candidates may receive public subsidies designed to 
approximate total campaign costs. For House candidates, the grant is $900,000 and for 
Senate candidates, it is $1.25 million plus $250,000 for each Congressional district. 
For both House and Senate races, that money is split for each election phase, with 40% 
of the payment intended for the primary election and 60% for the general election. 
Candidates also receive media vouchers ($100,000 per House district for all 
candidates) that they can use for significantly discounted media buys. Unlike the full 
funding programs working in state systems, there is no proposed spending limit for 
 103 
this federal program. Candidates may continue raising money after accepting the 
subsidy, and small contributions of less than $100 from the candidate’s state are 
matched at 4:1 up to a maximum of three times the original amount. 
 
As noted in this dissertation and elsewhere, full funding has shown promise in 
enhancing competition (see: Malhotra 2008; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2005). The 
FENA would certainly bolster the finances of most challengers, who raised less than 
$500,000 in 2008 (see: Jacobson 2009). However, the key difference between Clean 
Elections in the states and FENA is a spending cap, and my results should demonstrate 
that the difference between the programs in terms of the likely effect on campaign 
activities is a crucial consideration. In failing to cap spending for participating 
candidates, the FENA shows little promise in curbing fundraising activities. If there is 
no disincentive to stop fundraising after accepting a public subsidy, then there is little 
reason to believe that candidates who can afford sophisticated, consultant-driven 
funding operations will suddenly decide to stop devoting time and effort to 
fundraising. Even if $900,000 is enough for most candidates to wage a visible 
campaign, the FENA rules contribute to an arms-race mentality, and it is reasonable to 
expect that the gap between haves and have-nots would persist in federal elections.  
 
The fact that “good government” reform groups such as Common Cause have 
unequivocally endorsed the FENA before considering its effects on the conduct of 
campaigns is emblematic of the historical problem in public funding evaluation. Most 
everyone wants elections to be fairly conducted, publicly focused, and reasonably 
competitive, since Americans expect that good representation will follow. However, 
this dissertation demonstrates that the road between public funding and such elections 
is not an expressway, and merely believing that subsidies of any size are a panacea 
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does not make it so. Public funding makes elections more complicated, and as newer 
programs emerge, they will necessarily adapt to the future requirements set forth by 
the judiciary. This dissertation shows that the structure of such programs will lead to 
shifting incentives, altered behavior, and pervasive gaming among affected candidate 
populations. Not all of these changes will be positive. Nonetheless, before searching 
for the relationships we want to see, Americans must understand how the “fifth 
source” of political money changes the true conduct of their political campaigns. 
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